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ABSTRACT                                        
An Experimental Study of the Differences Between ‘Just’ and ‘Only’: 




Advisor: Dr. Janet Dean Fodor 
Throughout much of the theoretical semantic literature, the two exclusives only and just have been 
assumed identical in their structures and semantics. This manuscript contests that assumption, 
using parallel examples with negative polarity items (NPIs) and modals to demonstrate the 
asymmetry of these exclusives. After reviewing the existing theoretical literature, I utilize these 
examples to inform an experimental study centering around NPIs. This experiment (influenced by 
Chemla,  Homer, and Rothschild (2011)) employs an acceptability judgment task where 
participants (n=90) are asked to judge sentences containing negation, only, and just (both with and 
without NPIs) on a 6-point scale.  
Using a mixed effects model, the findings reveal a significant main effect for version (just vs. 
only) and a significant effect for presence or lack of an NPI, but no significant difference between 
just without an NPI and only without an NPI. Together, these results strongly suggest that 
participants find little or no difference in acceptability of sentences with these exclusives without 
the presence of NPIs, but a large degree of difference in acceptability of sentences containing these 
same exclusives with NPIs. This supports a theory where these two exclusives are different in 
nature. I propose my own theory, which promotes the idea of embracing two different sets of 
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1 Introduction            
The concept for this manuscript was built upon nearly a decade’s musings on the semantic 
contribution of the word just to a sentence. Sentences such as “Just leave me alone” and “I just like 
pancakes” caused some puzzlement, but ultimately it turned out that the best place to start was 
clearly with just’s sister word, only.  In English, just and only are frequently used words that belong 
to the group known as “exclusives1” and only has received the bulk of the research and has 
continued to do so (see Chapter 2). 
From the early stages of my research, a surprising revelation became clear: many 
researchers and theorists were treating just the same as only. While it was true that in some cases 
just could replace only and the resulting sentences could have much the same meaning, other 
minimal pairs revealed clear differences in acceptability. Throughout this project, I have primarily 
focused on just and only’s ability to license Negative Polarity Items, or NPIs, and their scope 
interactions with modals. Failure to note the acceptability differences between just and only  was 
an obvious gap in the literature and thus my focus shifted from simply examining the semantics of 
just to demonstrating the asymmetry between just and only and conceiving a theory to fit these 
discrepancies. 
Prior to my dissertation, my focus had been on looking at these exclusives theoretically. 
During that time, my many discussions with other English speakers led me to notice differences in 
judgments. Thus, I chose to bring my studies into the experimental realm to determine how strong 
and widespread opinions were on this matter. Akin to the existence of a gap in the theoretical 
literature examining the differences between these exclusives, there was a gap in the experimental 
literature as well. I created experimental sentences (with different versions distributed across 
                                                          
1 Exclusives are words that are primarily used to facilitate discourse by emphasizing certain words or phrases 
in a sentence. Some commonly held exclusives aside from only and just are merely, exclusively, solely, and but 
(archaic). (Beaver & Clark, 2008) 
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multiple lists) to determine how the average native English speaker judges sentences with just and 
only with and without NPIs. 
This manuscript overviews the theoretical semantic literature on exclusives and identifies 
the data that led me to become convinced that just behaves differently than only. From there the 
discussion delves into the experimental core, crediting prior studies, describing the pilot, detailing 
the final experimental methodology, and reporting the results and statistical analyses. With these 
data in hand, we then return to theoretical semantics, within which I propose my current theory for 
differing structures and semantics of only and just. This analysis has some merit, but I conclude by 
pointing out some shortcomings of this theory and identifying areas for future research. 
2 Prior theoretical analyses of only and just and the problem of NPIs 
 
When it comes to just and only, most of the theoretical semantics literature is concentrated 
around only, the exclusive which many consider to be the prototypical exclusive (e.g. Beaver & 
Clark, 20082). Just possesses an astoundingly vast number of usages and interpretations. Even 
discounting the adjective just (meaning “fair” or “lawful”), the environments in which just appears 
and the variety of meanings it contributes to sentences are numerous3. By contrast, only’s behavior 
is much more limited. With this in mind, it is understandable that much of the literature is centered 
on only, with just categorized among the “other exclusives.” The consequence of this tendency, 
however, is that the behaviors of only are often easily mistaken for the behaviors of all exclusives. 
For example, B&C (2008) state that VP-modifying exclusives license NPIs, but they only test 
sentences containing the prototypical exclusive, only. Many of their test sentences (B&C 2008, pg. 
                                                          
2 Henceforth “B&C (2008)” 
3 Examples of other usages of just outside of the scope of the current topic: 
(i) Eric had just arrived as Sarah was leaving. (Immediacy/Proximity) 
(ii) It’s just so difficult to find a good job. (Emphatic) 
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185–187) become ungrammatical with just, which they fully acknowledge to also be an exclusive 
(B&C 2008, pg. 68).  
The goal of this chapter is to explain how the prior literature has analyzed only and just, 
explore how these exclusives are similar, and illuminate how they demonstratively differ from one 
another in respect to their NPI licensing ability.  Using minimal pair sentences, I will demonstrate 
how the current semantic theory is unable to account for these differences. 
 
 
2.1 Restrictive and depreciative ‘just’: the type of ‘just’ that parallels ‘only’ 
 
There are two usages of just which parallel usages of only, called the “restrictive” and 
“depreciative” usages4. A restrictive usage of just enforces a limit of some kind whereas a 
depreciative usage of just minimizes the significance of some subsequent content. In semantic 
theory, these are more commonly known as “non-scalar” (or “logical”) and “scalar” usages 
respectively. Following are examples of each of these usages, also demonstrating that both just and 
only have the same interpretations in these types of usages.5 
(1) a. Restrictive/Non-Scalar: John couldn’t have eaten the last piece of cake because he 
just/only ate pasta tonight (and nothing else).        
Interpretation: John ate pasta tonight, he ate nothing else; therefore, he could not 
have eaten the last piece of cake. 
                                                          
4 There were two other categories (see footnote 2) that I also identified, but are not relevant to the rest of the 
analysis in this proposal. My usage categories for just  are slightly adapted from Lee’s (1987) categories of the 
same word. 
5 The reader should note that many sentences containing just can be ambiguous. For this reason, 
parenthetical statements have been added to many examples to avoid ambiguity. 
4 
 
 b. Depreciative/Scalar: John is just/only a student (not a teaching assistant or teacher), 
so he can’t go into the teacher’s lounge.        
Interpretation: John is a student, and he is nothing more (in regard to authority) 
than a student, so he cannot go into the teacher’s lounge.  
 
For both just and only, the meaning of sentences containing them crucially depends on 
prosodic marking. Speakers can easily change the perceived meaning of a sentence containing an 
exclusive by emphasizing a word or phrase, usually by pitch accent (emphasis marked here by 
capital letters). This is known as giving that word or phrase “prosodic prominence” (B&C, 2008): 
(2) John only invited BETH to the movie. 
(3)  John only invited Beth to the MOVIE. 
(4)  John only INVITED Beth to the movie. 
 
Sentences (2) – (4) contain the same words, but each sentence exhibits a different prosodic 
prominence, resulting in a distinct interpretation. Each sentence, however, shares one inference 
(known as the “prejacent”6): John invited Beth to the movie. The prejacent is presupposed by (i.e. a 
presupposition of) only. This can be seen by observing that the prejacent (John invited Beth to the 
movie), is implied by each of sentences (2) – (4) as well as their negations. For example, if (2) is 
changed to “John didn’t only invite BETH to the movie,” the presupposition is still “John invited Beth 
to the movie.” The assertion, however, is no longer “John invited Beth and no one else to the movie,” 
it is instead “It is not the case that John invited Beth and no one else to the movie” (the negation of 
the original sentence’s assertion). This demonstrates that when a sentence containing only is 
negated, the presupposition is the same, but the assertion will be negated. 
                                                          
6 The prejacent has played a very important role in the semantic understanding of only since Horn (1969). 
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In addition to the prejacent (which we will assume to be a presupposition, following Horn 
1969, and von Fintel 1999, among others), sentences containing only give rise to another inference: 
the exclusive inference.  It is standard to assume that the exclusive inference is the “assertion” of 
only. Below are (2) – (4) repeated with their presuppositions (P) and assertions (A).  In the next 
subsection, we will be revisiting how (2), (3), and (4) have different exclusive 
inferences/assertions, even though they contain the exact same words.  
 
(2) John only invited BETH to the movie. 
 P: John invited Beth to the movie 
 A: John invited no one other than Beth to the movie 
(3)  John only invited Beth to the MOVIE. 
 P: John invited Beth to the movie 
 A: John invited Beth to nothing other than the movie 
(4)  John only INVITED Beth to the movie. 
 P: John invited Beth to the movie 
A: John stood in no other relation to Beth and the movie other than invite (e.g. he 
didn’t drive her to the movie) 
 
The separation of the presupposition and the assertion is an important distinction. If a 
sentence which contains only is negated, the presupposition will survive and the assertion will not. 
In these sentences, prosodic prominence leads to different assertions. It emphasizes content for the 
purpose of comparing it to alternative options that are contextually salient. For example, sentence 
(2) can be uttered in a setting where prior discourse had not made it clear that John did not invite 
other context-available people to the movie (e.g. Eli, Daryl, and Lily).(2) provides the information 
that Beth was invited and Eli, Daryl, and Lily were not. A sentence such as (3) may be uttered in a 
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setting where other activities or events were lined up (e.g. a party, a dinner, and a hike) and the 
speaker wishes to emphasize that John invited Beth to the movie, not to any of the other events. 
Similarly, (4) can be spoken in a context where the speaker wants to clarify that John only engaged 
in inviting Beth to the movie, not some other action as well (e.g. driving her there)7. The 
prosodically prominent content in these sentences is said to be receiving “focus,” while the context-
salient alternate possibilities are formally known as “alternatives.”  
The same observations made for the sentences above containing only can be made for 
parallel sentences with just. In parallel sentences, both just and only also usually share which 
phrases they have the ability to emphasize, yielding the same interpretations. This can be seen in 
examples (5) – (7) below, which are identical to (2) – (4), except for the fact that only has been 
replaced by just: 
(5) John just invited BETH to the movie. 
 P: John invited Beth to the movie 
 A: John invited no one other than Beth to the movie 
(6)  John just invited Beth to the MOVIE. 
 P: John invited Beth to the movie 
 A: John invited Beth to nothing other than the movie 
(7)  John just INVITED Beth to the movie. 
 P: John invited Beth to the movie 
A: John stood in no other relation to Beth and the movie other than invite (e.g. he 
didn’t drive her to the movie) 
 
                                                          
7 This interpretation of (4) is solely the non-scalar interpretation as previously discussed where [VP only P] 
means “P and not Q.” It could also be interpreted as depreciative (or scalar), where [VP only P] means “P and 
nothing stronger than P.” Until scalarity is fully discussed in Section 1.2, we will be focusing on the 
restrictive/scalar interpretation of only. 
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2.2 Focus association, Alternative Semantics and their application to ‘only’ and ‘just’ 
 
As previously demonstrated, a given sentence containing only can have multiple 
interpretations depending on where the prosodic prominence is placed. This makes only a “focus-
sensitive” expression. Since prosodic marking has such important semantic consequences, the 
Logical Form (LF) representation of a sentence containing only must contain information that 
clearly distinguishes between the constituents that are marked for focus (known as the “focus 
associates”) and the constituents that are not. This “focus-marking” has both a phonological and a 
semantic effect. The phonological effect is the observed prosodic prominence, while the semantic 
effect is which alternatives are excluded. 
There can only be one focus-marked phrase per focus-sensitive expression. The standard 
convention for the representation of focus-marking is the enclosure of the focus associate inside a 
set of brackets with a subscript F following it (e.g. [Beth]F). Below are the same sentences examined 
in (2) – (4), repeated this time with focus-marking: 
 
(8)  John only invited [Beth]F to the movie. 
(9)  John only invited Beth to the [movie]F. 
(10)  John only [invited]F Beth to the movie. 
 
Only requires a focus-marked phrase to convey which content is being emphasized and 
demonstrate that alternatives exist to said content8. Focus-marked phrases are always interpreted 
as having alternatives, while phrases that do not receive focus are interpreted as not possessing 
alternatives. “Alternatives” are the alternate possibilities of a focus-marked sentence which are 
usually understood from context. When a sentence is analyzed under a theory of alternative 
                                                          
8 Even if the prosody sounds neutral, only must still have a semantically focused-marked phrase or else the 
sentence is ungrammatical. 
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semantics (such as Rooth 1985), these they create a complete set of all the possible alternatives to 
the prejacent of a focus-marked sentence. The following demonstrates the alternatives to (8): 
 (11) “John only invited [Beth]F to the movie” 
   Prejacent: John invited Beth to the movie. 
   Other individuals in the context: Eli, Daryl, Lily 
 
  Alternatives: 
   a. John invited Eli to the movie 
   b. John invited Daryl to the movie 
   c. John invited Lily to the movie 
 
 (11a) – (11c) is the complete set of alternatives to (8). Under an alternative semantics 
theory of only, a sentence’s assertion negates these alternatives. In the case of (8) and (11), only 
asserts that it is not the case that John invited Eli, Daryl, or Lily to the movie (each individual 
alternative is ruled out), returning the correct interpretation for the sentence: John invited Beth to 
the movie and no one else in the context.  For a formal account of how these alternatives are 
derived and how they are utilized, we will follow Rooth (1985, 1992) in assuming two semantic 
values for any given expression: an ordinary semantic value (OSV) and a focus semantic value 
(FSV). The OSV for a focus-marked name (such as [Beth]F) is the individual (i.e. Beth). The FSV of a 
focus-marked name is a set of context-salient alternatives (e.g. Eli, Daryl, and Lily).   
  
(12) Focus-marked name:[Beth]F 
  Individuals in the domain: Eli (e), Daryl (d), Lily (l), Beth (b), John (j) 
  OSV = b 




 A constituent containing a focus-marked phrase similarly has two semantic values. For this 
proposal we are taking the FSV of a sentence (also later represented by C) to be a set of alternative 
sentences (as opposed to propositions or truth values9): 
 
 (13)  “John invited [Beth]F to the movie” 
  Individuals in the domain: Eli, Daryl, Lily, Beth, John 
  OSV = “John invited Beth to the movie” 
  FSV = {"
"John invited Eli to the movie"
John invited Daryl to the movie"
"John invited Lily to the movie"
} 
 
 The OSV of the sentence “John invited [Beth]F to the movie” is the sentence “John invited 
Beth to the movie.” The FSV is the set of sentences that vary in regard to the focus-marked phrase 
(i.e. in this case, sentences of the form “John invited x to the movie”). These are the salient 
alternatives in the context.  
Now to return to only. Below, two minimal pair sentences are compared: “John only invited 
[Beth]F to the movie” and “John only invited Beth to the [movie]F:” 
 
(14) Individuals in the domain: Eli, Daryl, Lily, Beth, John 
Activities in the domain: hike, party, dinner, movie 
 
a.  “John only invited [Beth]F to the movie” 
   OSV = “John invited Beth to the movie” 
FSV = set of sentences (C) of the form “John invited x to the movie.” 
                                                          
9 While traditionally, the FSV has been referred to as a “set of propositions” (Rooth 1985), referring to it instead as 




”John invited Eli to the movie”
John invited Daryl to the movie”
”John invited Lily to the movie"
} 
b. “John only invited Beth to the [movie]F.” 
OSV = “John invited Beth to the movie” 
FSV = set of sentences of the form “John invited Beth to y.” 
C = {"
"John invited Beth to the hike"
John invited Beth to the party"
"John invited Beth to the dinner"
} 
 
 As demonstrated, Rooth’s alternative semantics provide us with a way to express how (14a) 
is semantically different from (14b). Each sentence portrays John as possessing a different set of 
properties (i.e. the properties of inviting x to the movie vs. the properties of inviting Beth to y), 
which leads to a different FSV for each sentence. For (14a), John’s set of properties is inviting some 
person to the movie, whereas in (14b) his set of properties is inviting Beth to some activity. 
 Utilizing Rooth’s FSV, we can now write a simple formula10 for only that incorporates 
alternatives. Here (and throughout the rest of the paper), only is treated as a sentential operator. 
The following formula consists of a presupposition (the condition for being defined11) and an 
assertion (if defined, the conditions for its truth). If the reader will recall from the previous section, 
only being composed of a presupposition and an assertion is attributed to Horn(1969) 12, and is 
widely accepted in the literature. We will be similarly observing it here: 
 (15) ⟦onlyC S⟧w is defined only if (i.e. presupposes that) ⟦S⟧w = 1. 
                                                          
10 The following formula is a slightly modified version of the formula proposed for only by von Fintel (1999). 
11 “Defined” meaning it has a truth value. 
12 Horn (1969) breaks only into “NP only” and “VP only,” but both of them exhibit a presupposition and 
assertion. He defines NP only as a two-place predicate which takes a term (within its scope) and a proposition 
containing that term. VP only he describes as a three-place predicate, which takes a predicate, a proposition 
containing that predicate, and a scale of degree. 
11 
 
If defined, ⟦onlyC S⟧w = 1 iff ∀S′(S′ ϵ C) & S ⇏ S′   ⟦S′⟧w = 013 
  
[OnlyC] refers to the node14 that is composed of only and C (the set of alternatives). When 
the sentential operator only is applied to a sentence S in a given world (denoted by superscript w), 
the semantics in (15) states that this structure (i.e. ⟦onlyC S⟧w) is defined only if S is true in the 
same world (otherwise known as it presupposes the truth of S). If defined, ⟦onlyC S⟧w is true if and 
only if for all other sentences S′, if S′ is a member of C (the focus semantic value of S) and it is not a 
logical consequence of S15, then S′ is false. This will end up negating all the alternatives in C that are 
not entailed by S, which results in the desired interpretation of only coupled with S. Ensuring that 
logical consequences are not ruled out is essential to ensure that for a sentence such as “John only 
invited [Beth and Mary]F”, the alternatives “John invited [Beth]F and John invited [Mary]F” are not 
incorrectly ruled out, while still negating an alternative such as “John invited [Eli]F.” (To see the 
formula in (15) applied to a simple sentence containing only, see Appendix A.) 
 There is one problem with this all of this, however: there is another usage of only that we 
have been putting aside. The formula in (15) does not properly account for the scalar usage of only. 
As stated before, only can be used in both a scalar and non-scalar manner. In the previous examples 
used to demonstrate only and its theoretical background, we have confined ourselves to non-scalar 
interpretations for simplicity’s sake, but only has scalar interpretations as well. 
A scalar use of an exclusive creates a scale by organizing its members in order of their 
relative “strength” to each other. The weakness or strength of each member cannot be inferred by 
logical entailment, unlike a non-scalar (or logical) use, which follows standard entailment. While a 
                                                          
13 The assertion could also be written as the following: 
(i) If defined, ⟦onlyC S⟧w = 1 iff ¬∃S′ [(S′ ϵ C) & S ⇏ S′ & ⟦S′⟧w = 0] 
(i) is equivalent to “If defined, ⟦onlyC S⟧w = 1 iff ∀S′(S′ ϵ C) & S ⇏ S′   ⟦S′⟧w = 0” 
 
14 “Node” meaning a location in a binary branching syntactic structure, which is the mother of two sisters. 
15 In (26), “S ⇏ S′” is taken to be interpreted the same as “⟦S⟧ is not a subset of ⟦S′⟧” 
12 
 
non-scalar usage of only could still create a scale, the weakness or strength of each member could 
be derived using logical entailment (Beaver & Clark, 2008). Examples (16) and (17) demonstrate 
both uses: 
(16) Non-scalar: Mary only met [John]F at the orientation. (She met no one else.) 
(17) Scalar: Mary only met an [assistant professor]F at the orientation. (She didn’t meet 
anyone of a higher rank.) 
Sentence (16) is a non-scalar usage of only because no non-logical scale is involved. These 
are the types of sentences that have previously been examined above. Example (17), however, 
differs.  Without the parenthetical addition, (17) can be interpreted as a non-scalar usage of only. If 
interpreted in this manner, the meaning is that Mary met an assistant professor at the orientation 
and no one else at all. This interpretation is very similar to (16): the sentence is false if Mary met 
anyone else at the orientation. Specifically, the presupposition to the non-scalar interpretation of 
(16) is that Mary met an assistant professor at the orientation. The assertion is that Mary met no 
one at the orientation that was not that specific assistant professor individual. 
As (17) is written, however (with the parenthetical addition), the meaning is scalar. A scale 
is created for this sentence. Let us suppose that the scale is composed of student >teacher’s 
assistant >assistant professor >tenured professor >vice president >president. The scalar 
interpretation of (17) is that Mary met no one at the orientation that had a higher rank than 
assistant professor on the aforementioned scale. Perhaps she met some other students as well as 
teacher’s assistants, but she didn’t meet any tenured professors, vice presidents, or presidents.  
Meeting a president does not logically entail meeting an assistant professor (presidents don’t have 
to also be assistant professors, nor must they be always accompanied by assistant professors), so a 
non-logical scale is required in order to make sense of the intended meaning.  
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The presupposition to the scalar version of (17) is that Mary met an assistant professor at 
the orientation (the same as the non-scalar version). The assertion, however, is different: Mary met 
no one at the orientation who was higher ranked on the perceived scale (she met an assistant 
professor and perhaps a student or students, but not any tenured professors, vice presidents, or 
presidents). If she had met any person who had a higher rank on the scale, then their position 
would have been mentioned in this sentence in conjunction with only (e.g. “Mary only met a 
tenured professor at the orientation”). The scalar usage negates the possibility of Mary meeting 
anyone higher ranked on the scale, therefore the highest rank she met must be the one mentioned 
in the sentence. 
Now we return to the formula defined in the previous section and configure it to work for 
scalar interpretations. Fortunately, it’s not difficult to do so. Taking the formula in (15), if instead 
the formula checks whether S is less than (or equal to) S′ on a scale instead of whether S entails S′, 
the scalar interpretation can be derived: 
 
(18) ⟦onlyC S⟧w is defined only if (i.e. presupposes that) ⟦S⟧w = 1. 
If defined, ⟦onlyC S⟧w = 1 iff ∀S′(S′ ϵ C) & S ≰S S′   ⟦S′⟧w = 0 
 
 The subscript S refers to a scale which S is on. This modified formula can also be applied to 
non-scalar uses of only if we allow for the scale to also be a logical scale (e.g. Beth is lower on a 
scale than Mary and Beth).  
Focus association and Alternative Semantics are as applicable to just as they are to only for 
all the same theoretical reasons previously addressed in this subsection. The issue, however, is that 
much of the prior literature has treated the formulae (scalar and non-scalar) for ⟦only S⟧ as the 
exact same as ⟦just S⟧ due to their frequent interchangeability.  The potential flaws of applying the 
formulae in (15) and (18) (or similar formulae) to both exclusives will soon become apparent. 
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2.3 NPI licensing differences 
 
While it’s clear that just shares much in common with only (compare (5) – (7) with (2) – 
(4)) , I have observed a difference in their ability to license negative polarity items16 (words or 
phrases that are only licit under certain circumstances; henceforth, NPIs) which significantly 
complicates matters. When only appears in a position where it modifies a Verb Phrase, it has been 
well-documented in ability to license NPIs (von Fintel 1999, B&C 2008). For example: 
 
(19)  John  only ever [dislikedF Sally] 
  only NPI Verb Phrase 
Interpretation: At any time in the past, it was not the case that John had any stronger 
negative feelings for Sally than dislike (e.g. hate) 
 
Considering the number of similarities between just and only, it would be reasonable to 
expect them to behave similarly in regard to their ability to license NPIs. Surprisingly, this is not the 
case. Below is the same sentence as in (19), except that just has been substituted for only: 
(20)  #John  just  ever  [dislikedF Sally]17 
  just NPI Verb Phrase 
 
                                                          
16 Some of the most common NPIs are words like ever or any (note that there is a different kind of any, called 
free-choice any, which is NOT an NPI). NPIs are named such because of their tendency to be licit following a 
negative item of some sort, such as no, not, never, no one, etc. As has been widely accepted, however, NPIs can 
appear with items that are not overtly negative (e.g. whether, doubt, if, etc.). Taken together (negative items 
and non-overtly negative items alike), these items are said to be “NPI licensers:” words or phrases that must 
be present in the environment for the NPI to be licit.  
17 The # here means that the sentence is unacceptable, or at least does not mean the same thing as its 
counterpart with only. 
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Interpretation: ???  
 
We find that we do not get the same interpretation from (20) that we observed in (19).  
Sentences (19) and (20) demonstrate that while only acts as an NPI licenser, just appears to be 
unable to do the same. This is extremely puzzling and led me to propose an experiment to reveal 
whether other native English speakers shared these intuitions. 
 
 
3 Conceptualizing the Experiment and Running the Pilot 
 
As previously mentioned, there exists little theoretical work on either the direct comparison of 
exclusives (see Coppock and Beaver 2011 and 2014 for some of their work on the topic) or 
specifically on just (see Lee 1991). There is even less experimental work on either matter (Lee 
1987 is one such experiment).  The combination of this gap in the literature and the fact that such a 
large amount of the literature either ignores the existence of just in favor of only (or states the two 
are the same), led me to conclude that an experiment would be the best route for determining 
whether English speakers really intuit these two exclusives as being different from each other. It 
would give me an opportunity to test the psychological reality of the judgments I had observed. 
 My experiment focused on the observed NPI licensing differences between just and only.  
I incorporated two modal/scope interaction sentences (for reasons that will become clear in 
Chapter 6) to gather a small amount of information regarding the relationship between the 
judgments of them and the judgments of the NPI + exclusive sentences with the intent to run a later 
experiment. 
 While preparing for my experiment, I knew it would need to have comparisons between 
sentences with an exclusive + no NPI and an exclusive + NPI.  NPIs have received much more 
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experimental work than exclusives, meaning I could draw upon them when designing my own 
experiment. There was one NPI experiment in particular that facilitated in the creation of my 
experimental framework and stimuli: Chemla,  Homer, and Rothschild (2011). 
 
 
3.1 Chemla et al. (2011) – a basis for my experiment 
The core of my experiment was inspired by Chemla et al. (2011) who report a series of 
experiments utilizing French sentences which addressed the relationship between monotonicity 
properties and NPIs18. As will later be discussed in depth, NPIs are generally theorized to only be 
licit in Downward Entailing (DE) environments. This experiment tested whether participants found 
NPIs to be licit only in actual DE environments or whether NPIs were judged licit in all 
environments that participants perceived to be DE. 
This experiment (with 45 native French-speaking adults as participants) consisted of two 
types of items: NPI sentence pairings and monotonicity inference pairings. These sentence types 
were presented in two separate experiment blocks and the presentation order for these blocks 
randomized for each participant. While the content of some of the sentence pairings across blocks 
were similar (e.g. chaque alien appeared in multiple examples as the subject), all experiment items 
were unique (i.e. no sentence appeared in both blocks).  
For the NPI sentence pairings, participants were given pairs of minimally different 
sentences presented on the same screen. The sentences, which always contained quantifiers, were 
identical other than the fact that the first did not have an NPI and the second did have an NPI 
(always presented in this order). The NPI was always the same: le moindre (“the least”), a word 
that Chemla et al. maintained to be very similar to English NPI any. 
                                                          
18 This series of experiments was also concerned with the relationship between monotonicity properties and 
Scalar Implicatures, but the discussion of those sections has not been included here, since it is not relevant to 
the topic at hand. 
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(21) (a)  Chaque alien a de l’intérêt pour la littérature. 
Each alien takes an interest in literature. 
(b) Chaque alien a le moindre intérêt pour la littérature. 
Each alien takes any interest in literature.  
      (Chemla et al. 2011) 
 
Participants were asked to rate the naturalness of each sentence of the pair on a continuous scale 
from “weird” to “natural.” It was a continuous scale (indicated by an adjustable red line) in that it 
had no numbers and that participants could set the length at any point between the two extremes, 
“weird” and “natural.” 
 For the monotonicity inference pairings, the participants were given minimally different 
sentences where one sentence contained a phrase that denoted a set and the other sentence 
contained a phrase that denoted a subset of that set. An example of such a sentence pair is (61): 
(22)  “Chaque alien a goûté du saumon fumé.” 
 Chaque alien a goûté du saumon. 
 
Each alien tasted smoked salmon. (subset) 
Each alien tasted salmon.  (set) 
 
The first sentence (the premise) was always put in quotes, while the second sentence (the 
conclusion) appeared to the right of an arrow below the first sentence, as above. Sentences 
alternated whether the premise or the conclusion possessed the set or subset word. Participants 
were asked to make an inferential judgment on whether the conclusion followed from the premise 
(which would either be a case of UE or DE, depending on whether the first or second sentence 
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contained the subset). For this judgment they again used a continuous scale where they set the 
length of a red line anywhere between the two extremes of “weak” to “strong.”  
 Chemla et al. (2011) found NPI judgments and monotonicity judgments to be correlated, 
with the combination of UE and DE predicting NPI judgments with a mean correlation coefficient of 
.458. The UE/DE combination provided a better prediction than DE alone (.458 vs. .281, p = .0012) 
or UE alone (.458 vs. .232, p = .0004). Furthermore, they found evidence of what they call a 
“subjectivity approach,” such that a participant is more likely to accept an NPI in an environment 
that they believe to be DE, rather than in a “true” DE environment19, finding that intra-subject 
subjective monotonicity is a better predictor of NPI judgments than inter-subject subjective 
monotonicity. Chemla et al. computed scores for each participant which corresponded to the 
frequency at which the judgments of other participants led to a better predictor than the predictor 
obtained for that participant’s own judgments.  
 I chose to adapt Chemla et al.’s (2011) methodology as a basis for my own NPI experiment 
with several changes. My own stimuli were in English (as opposed to French) and I was concerned 
with negation, only, and just (as opposed to quantifiers), but like Chemla et al., I presented subjects 
with pairs of parallel sentences that only differed in the addition of an NPI. While Chemla et al. 
recruited undergraduate students and conducted their experiment in-person, I recruited 
participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk and conducted my experiment online using the 
Qualtrics surveying software. Finally, the way the participants rated the sentences differed: instead 
of a continuous scale, I used a fixed number scale with six different intervals numbered 1 to 6.  
 
 
                                                          
19 However, in this experiment UE environments were judged UE more than DE environments were (Chemla et al. 
report M=78.0% vs. M=44.3%, p < .001), and DE environments were judged DE more than UE environments were 
(Chemla et al. report M=69.4% vs. M=41.2%, p < .001). 
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3.2 The pilot: methodology and examples 
  
Before running the full dissertation experiment, I first ran a preliminary test on non-linguists both 
to gauge how they felt about NPI + only vs. NPI + just sentences as well as to try out two specific 
variations of the experiment. This was a small informal experiment (which I call here the “pilot”) 
with three volunteer participants at the end of June/beginning of July 2016. All three participants 
were college-educated males between the ages of 25 and 35 who were not involved in the 
Linguistics field. The pilot was conducted through Qualtrics and the participants were given a link 
to it. In this section, I discuss the stimuli creation and methodology (with examples) of this 
preliminary experiment. 
The experimental sentences were created to follow a particular format. Each item was short 
enough to fit on a single line when displayed to participants and neither the content nor the 
syntactic structure of the sentence was intended to be confusing or difficult. Rather than present 
each experimental item as two sentences, each experimental item was composed of two parts 
separated by a semicolon. These two parts were contrastive in nature.  
(23)  That restaurant doesn’t serve SOUP with its entrees; it serves SALAD. 
The first part of the sentence was longer than the second part, as the second part was 
merely intended to ensure the correct focus and contrast was being made by the participant. Each 
part contained a word that was receiving focus (written in capital letters to make clear this 
emphasis). Each experimental item began with a simple determiner phrase (DP) (either a name or 
a short, commonly used phrase) and used either present or future tense. This was to avoid as much 
confusion as possible regarding various other usages of just (e.g. “John just drank” to mean that 
John very recently drank something, whereas this particular ambiguity does not occur with “John 
just drinks” or “John will just drink”).  
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The location of the exclusives and the NPIs also had to be carefully considered. While only is 
widely accepted in a phrase or sentence initial position (e.g. Only John likes candy), many native 
English speakers do not accept just in a similar position (e.g. Just John likes candy), meaning that 
the exclusive could never appear in this position in the examples. For the experimental items 
containing NPIs, these NPIs had to be placed within a PP to ensure that the NPI did not occur within 
the same phrase as a focused item. Only is theorized to only license NPIs that are not within the 
same scope as the focused phrase20 (Horn 1996, von Fintel 1999, Beaver & Clark 2008, among 
others), so in order to demonstrate any genuine acceptability difference between just and only, 
NPIs have to be placed in a potentially acceptable spot for both. The only two NPIs used in the 
experiment were any and ever. These two NPIs were decided upon because they are extremely 
common in usage. Any was used in sentences with an NP focus while ever was utilized in sentences 
with a VP focus. Examples of the only  + NPI versions of each NPI are as follows: 
 (24) That restaurant only serves SOUP with any of its entrees; it doesn’t serve SALAD. 
 
(25) Mary only ever TEXTS her friends on the weekends; she doesn’t CALL them. 
 
 All participants saw the same 48 sentences. These sentences were composed of 12 sets of 
sentences, each set containing 4 different versions. These versions were 1) a sentence containing 
negation and no NPI (Type A sentences) 2) the same sentence, also containing negation, with an 
NPI (Type B sentences), 3) the same sentence with only switched in for negation and an NPI (Type 
C sentences), and 4) the same sentence with just switched in for negation and an NPI (Type D 
sentences). 
                                                          
20 In Horn (1996) he demonstrates this elegantly by using a sentence with two NPIs: Only young writers ever accept 




An example of one of these sets of four follows (the full set of pilot experimental items can 
be found in Appendix D): 
(26) 1A Jonathan doesn't drink BEER at his parties; he drinks WINE.    
1B Jonathan doesn't drink BEER at any of his parties; he drinks WINE.   
1C Jonathan only drinks BEER at any of his parties; he doesn't drink WINE. 
1D Jonathan just drinks BEER at any of his parties; he doesn't drink WINE. 
 
Half of the experimental sentence sets utilized any as their NPI (“NP + any”) with the other 
half utilizing ever as their NPI (“ever + VP”). There were no fillers included in the pilot. After a 
short tutorial session, participants judged each sentence by the following protocol: “Given a normal 
context, I can say this sentence.” To answer this prompt, participants were given a 6-point scale 
with 1 being “Absolutely Disagree” and 6 being “Absolutely Agree.” 
 My predictions for the pilot were the following: 
(27) Prediction 1: Participants would generally place the Type A and Type B sentences on 
the high end of scale (5s or 6s) 
Prediction 2: Participants would generally find the Type C sentences more 
acceptable than the Type D sentences. 
Prediction 3: Participants would generally place Type D sentences on the low end of 
the scale (1s or 2s) 
 
There were two different versions of the pilot. The first participant received an ordered 
version, with all versions of the same sentence set following in the same sequential order (the order 
being NEG + no NPI, NEG + NPI, ONLY + NPI, JUST + NPI). The second and third participants 
22 
 
received a randomly ordered version where the order of all sentences was randomized (items of 
the same set only appeared next to each other by chance). This was done to assist in deciding 
whether to use an ordered sentence set where items of a sentence pair were placed one after 
another (as Chemla et al. did) or a pseudo-randomized sentence set (as suggested might be better 
by one of my advisors21) in my final experiment. All 48 experimental items were displayed on the 
same screen (while it was not physically possible for participants to see all of the sentences at the 
same time, they could freely scroll between them). While none of the sentence judgments were 
forced choice (i.e. they were permitted to skip), all pilot participants judged all items.  
All three participants were also asked to participate in a follow-up written debriefing. This 
debriefing contained questions about how they felt concerning the individual items and regarding 
their thoughts on the ordered or randomized sequence (whichever corresponded to the experiment 
version they completed) presented to them in the pilot. Only two participants completed their 
briefing, one for the ordered set and one for the randomized set. 
 
 
3.3 Results of the pilot and conclusion based on survey feedback 
 
 For the pilot, Prediction 1 was confirmed outside of some potentially problematic 
sentences, which will be touched on shortly. Participants generally liked the Type A and Type B 
sentences, usually ranking them in the 4 – 6 range. Prediction 3 was also confirmed. Overall, the 
participants did not tend to accept the Type D sentences, often ranking them 1 – 2. Prediction 2 was 
not confirmed, however. While some of the participants did rank some of the Type C sentences in 
the 4 – 6 range, the same participants ranked some other Type C sentences in the 1 – 3 range. What 
is encouraging, however, is that the participants generally rated the Type C sentences as more 
                                                          
21 My thanks to Martin Chodorow 
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acceptable than the Type D sentences, even if their ratings of the Type C sentences were lower than 
I expected. Combined with the confirmation of Prediction 1 and Prediction 3, this makes me 
confident in pursuing this experiment on a larger scale. 
 After surveying the individual judgments of the pilot data, I was able to identify some 
possible problem sentences. Sentence sets 5, 7, and 9 seemed particularly problematic for the 
participants, potentially due to some sort of strangeness of the content (for example, sentence set 9 
revolved around the idea of borrowing clothes from friends, which has been revealed to me as an 
odd concept for some individuals). 
 The debriefing revealed some interesting insight on how the participants felt about the 
ordered vs. randomized sequence of sentences. Subject A (who took the ordered sequence version) 
commented that despite trying to score each sentence individually, he found himself being able to 
predict how he was going to respond to later sentences in a set. This may have influenced his 
judgments in an unintended way (and, indeed, his judgments took on a fairly formulaic pattern not 
exhibited by the two subjects who received the randomized sequencing). When asked to imagine 
what it would be like  if the sentences had been randomized, he said the task would have likely 
required more of his concentration, forcing him to read and reread each individual sentence to 
make sure he read it correctly and that it made sense to him. 
 Subject B (who took the randomized sequence version) stated that there were two or three 
times that he found the randomized ordering to be distracting. He mentioned scrolling back to 
double check that the sentence was not identical to one he had answered before22. Other than that, 
                                                          
22 This type of behavior certainly should not be allowed in a final experiment, and I’m glad that the subject 
brought this desire to my attention. It highlighted the importance of two elements: 1) that experiment items 
should be presented on their own screen, and 2) that the instructions should clearly explain that each 
sentence (regardless of its similarity to other sentences) should be judged on their own, without any 
comparison to other sentences. 
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he was comfortable with the randomized ordering, even suggesting that in a future version I might 
want to consider ensuring that similar items be placed a minimum distance apart. 
 From these two debriefings, I decided to pursue a pseudo-randomized ordering for my final 
experiment. The ordered sequence appeared to potentially cause issues with participants 
attempting to evaluate each sentence individually (perhaps even resulting in premature 
judgments) while the randomized ordering did not appear to be overly confusing. 
 The preliminary findings of the pilot were encouraging enough to pursue the experiment in 
full, keeping the core methodology and purpose of the experiment the same, while implementing 
some changes moving forward. 
 
 
4 Methodology of the NPI Experiment 
After running the pilot experiment, it was clear that while the core idea of the experiment was 
sound, the format and stimuli needed some revisions.  
 The heart of the experiment stayed the same: 12 experimental items were used, each with 
multiple versions. These experimental items maintained their general structure (one sentence 
divided into two parts by a semicolon) and continued to be thematically contrastive in nature. 
Participants were still asked to judge the acceptability of these sentences on a 6-point scale. Other 
parts of the experiment changed substantially from the pilot, which I’ve divided into five categories: 
 (28) Changes Made from Pilot to Final Experiment 
a. The experimental sentences were modified; some of them were completely changed 
from their pre-pilot version 
b. Sentence sets were larger 
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c. Participants saw fewer experimental items from the same sentence set (three 
different lists were introduced and participants were divided equally between 
them) 
d. Filler items were introduced 
e. All items (filler and experimental) were pseudo-randomized 
I will now describe in detail the experimental stimuli (how they were created and how they differed 
from the pilot) and the implementation of the experiment. 
 
4.1 The format of experimental sentences 
 
While each part of the sentence still had one word focused (with the focus conveyed to the reader 
by using capitalized letters), only NPs were focused in the final experiment. This contrasts with the 
pilot where half of the experimental items had NPs focused and the other half had VPs focused. This 
was to maintain as much parallelism as possible between sentences where the NPI ever was added 
and sentences where the NPI any was added (in the pilot, ever was always accompanied by a VP 
focus and any was always accompanied by an NP focus). 
 These focused NPs were also modified. The experimental sentences each had two NPs 
focused, just like the pilot (the first focused NP in the first part of the sentence, before the 
semicolon, with the second focused NP in the second part of the sentence); however, in the final 
experiment, the first focused NP was selected to be exactly two syllables in length with stress on the 
second syllable. This NP was either a name or a noun following the determiner the. Examples 
include Bernard, Denise, champagne, and desserts). This was done because it was specifically 
suggested to me that having final stress on a two-syllable word facilitated getting the proper focus 
26 
 
for the sentence.23 This may have to do with some type of perceived ease of giving the phonological 
markers of emphasis (e.g. high volume, higher pitch, lengthening of the vowel) to the second 
syllable. 
 Sentences also underwent substantial change in order to avoid having the NPI ever appear 
directly adjacent to NEG, JUST, or ONLY. There was concern that the term only ever may either be 
some sort of set term (or perhaps simply read/spoken more often) compared to just ever. To 
combat any phrase familiarization effects, all sentences containing ever had intervening material 
between it and the exclusive/negation. For example: 
(29) The rich couple only claim that the CHAUFFEUR ever dented their sports car; they 
don’t claim that the VALET did. 
Finally, several specific experimental sentences were changed with the intent to make them 
less confusing or pragmatically strange. Sentence sets 5, 7, 9, and 11 (from the pilot) were changed 
to a significant degree in their content. Sentence set 4 received a very minor change (the tense was 
changed to present as opposed to future). (For a full list of the final version of the experimental 
sentence sets, see Appendix F.) 
 
4.2 The sentence sets 
In the pilot, four experimental sentences comprised a sentence set (NEG with no NPI, NEG with NPI, 
ONLY with NPI and JUST with NPI). In the final experiment, a full sentence set contained six 
sentences, divided into “A” sentences (no NPI) and “B” sentences (NPI): 
(30)  The six types of variations for a sentence set 
a.  A-NEG: The sentence with negation and no NPI 
                                                          
23 My thanks to Danielle Ronkos and Janet Dean Fodor (p.c.) for this suggestion. 
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b.  A-ONLY: The sentence with ONLY and no NPI  
c. A-JUST: The sentence with JUST and no NPI 
d. B-NEG: The sentence with negation and an NPI (either “ever” or “any”)  
e. B-ONLY: The sentence with ONLY and an NPI (either “ever” or “any”)  
f. B-JUST: The sentence with JUST and an NPI (either “ever” or “any”) 
 
(31) Examples of a full sentence set 
A-NEG  John doesn’t know that JEROME visited our friends in Sweden; he 
knows that MARY visited them. 
A-ONLY  John only knows that JEROME visited our friends in Sweden; he 
doesn’t know that MARY visited them. 
A-JUST  John just knows that JEROME visited our friends in Sweden; he 
doesn’t know that MARY visited them. 
B-NEG  John doesn’t know that JEROME ever visited our friends in Sweden; 
he knows that MARY visited them. 
B-ONLY  John only knows that JEROME ever visited our friends in Sweden; he 
doesn’t know that MARY visited them. 
B-JUST  John just knows that JEROME ever visited our friends in Sweden; he 
doesn’t know that MARY visited them. 
 
 These additional versions were added in order to get the full contrast between how 
participants rated ONLY + no NPI vs. ONLY + NPI sentences, JUST + no NPI vs. JUST +NPI 
sentences, and ONLY + NPI vs. JUST + NPI sentences. The NEG sentences were there to act as a type 
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of control, since all participants were expected to rate both NEG + no NPI and NEG + NPI sentences 
high on the scale. 
Rather than each participant seeing all six variations of a sentence set, they only saw one 
pairing of each sentence, consisting of the matching A and B sentences. For example, Participant X 
only saw the A-NEG and B-NEG pairing of one of the 12 experimental sentences while Participant Y 
only saw the A-ONLY and B-ONLY pairing of the same experimental sentence. Which pairing a 
participant saw was determined through the creation of three different lists. These lists contained 
exactly one pairing of each experimental item and were composed of 4 NEG pairings, 4 ONLY 
pairings, and 4 JUST pairings. Across all lists, an equal number of participants saw each pairing 
across sentence sets. (See Appendix I for a complete “List Composition,” which details the specific 
sentence set versions found in each list.) 
 
4.3 The fillers 
Since the participants of the pilot were unpaid volunteers who participated purely as a personal 
favor, that experiment contained only experimental items in order to keep the task as short as 
possible. The final experiment contained filler items due to their importance in preventing 
participants’ desensitization to the particular words or items under study (in this case, the words 
only, just, any and ever).  
Because the experimental items were arranged in pairs, most of the fillers were also 
arranged into pairs. A total of 21 filler pairs (meaning 42 individual sentences), each falling into one 
of three different categories, were created for the final experiment. Another 13 fillers (not arranged 
in pairs) were created in a fourth category, resulting in a total of 55 filler sentences. Each 
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participant saw 54 of these filler sentences24, a number that was chosen to allow for 48 fillers 
(double the number of experimental sentences) plus 3 additional warm-up fillers and another 3 
additional fillers at the very end of the task. All fillers followed the format of the experimental 
sentences in the following ways: 
(32) a. Each sentence contained two parts separated by a semicolon 
  b. Each sentence had a thematically contrastive nature 
c. The contrasting words in the two parts of the sentence were capitalized  
 
First, let us discuss the 42 fillers arranged into sentence sets. These filler sets only had two 
versions (as opposed to the six found for experimental sets): the “A” version (absence of a 
particular word or phrase in the first part of the sentence) and the “B” version (presence of a 
particular word or phrase in the first part of the sentence). Just as in the experimental B versions, 
the inserted word/phrase was purposefully not placed adjacent to the focused phrase. The 
particular word or phrase that was inserted was directly dependent on the filler category the filler 
came from. The three filler set categories are outlined below in (5) – (7) and are each accompanied 
with an example sentence pair25: 
(33) Modifier on an NP 
Either the word last or next was inserted next to an NP in the B version of the filler 
sentence 
Example: 
F2A  The tech representative tells me that JULIA worked night shifts this week; he 
didn’t tell me that HARVEY did, too. 
                                                          
24 The discrepancy between 55 created sentences and 54 witnessed sentences is addressed shortly. 
25 The bold text in the example sentences for filler set categories (5) – (7) are to facilitate the reader in locating the 
inserted word; they were not bolded when presented to participants. 
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F2B   The tech representative tells me that JULIA worked night shifts this last 
week; he didn’t tell me that HARVEY did, too. 
 
(34) Modifier on a VP 
Adverbs were inserted to modify a VP in the B version of the filler sentence 
 Example: 
F11A   The child is upset that ALPHONSE sipped her apple juice; she isn’t upset that 
WALLACE did. 
F11B The child is upset that ALPHONSE rudely sipped her apple juice; she isn’t 
upset that WALLACE did. 
 
(35) Contrastive (without negation) 
These sentences were designed to be thematically contrastive in nature without 
using negation; the words/phrases used to modify the B versions conveyed some 
kind of degree: really, kind of, a little 
 Example: 
F21A   Gilbert brags that his GRANDMOTHER excels at cribbage; Felicity brags that 
her HUSBAND does. 
F21B * Gilbert brags that his GRANDMOTHER excels really at cribbage; Felicity 
brags that her HUSBAND does. 
 
 Now let us return to the fourth filler category: the fillers that were not presented in pairs. 
These 13 fillers were categorized as “Short Story fillers” because they were all prefaced with an 
indicated “Situation.” Each of them also contained a modal (either may, must, should, or could). 
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 These fillers differed from both the experimental sentence sets and filler sets in order to 
test a secondary prediction. When I conceived this experiment, I posited that the differing NPI-
licensing behaviors of just and only are directly related to their differing modal/scope interactions 
(full discussion to follow in Chapter 6). In the same way as just fails to license NPIs, certain 
interpretations (i.e. the inverse scope interpretation, which directly contrasts with the surface 
interpretation) of just when combined with modals like may appear to be blocked. If these two 
phenomena are linked, we would expect an individual to have a more or less equal tolerance for 
just licensing NPIs and the inverse scope interpretation of just + may sentences. 
In order to gain some insight into this relationship (for a potential future experiment), three 
modal/scope fillers were created which each contained the modal may. To assist the reader in 
getting the desired interpretation, some sort of context had to be provided; thus, the “Situation” 
was created to preface the sentence, leading to the name “Short Story filler.” Three Short Story 
fillers (all containing the modal may) had two versions: a just version and an only version. For ease 
of reference, let us call these special fillers “exclusive fillers.” These versions only differed in which 
of these two words were used (unlike the NPI examples, there was no NEG version) and they were 
prefaced with the exact same situation. The situation was created to only be felicitous with an only 
+ may sentence by the theory outlined in Chapter 1. As with all the other sentences, participants 
were asked to judge the sentence on a 1-6 point scale in terms of acceptability and truthfulness. All 
three exclusive fillers, with both just and only versions, can be found in (36)-(38): 
 
(36) FIL22 (13: may_Pizza) 
Situation: Nick is a 10-year-old kid who aced his math exam in school today. His mother will 
order him a pizza tonight to celebrate. Nick asks if they can also order some breadsticks, but 




Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 
(Note: participants only saw one of the following two options, dependent on list) 
13-ONLY Nick may only eat PIZZA for dinner tonight; he may not have BREADSTICKS 
as well. 
13-JUST Nick may just eat PIZZA for dinner tonight; he may not have BREADSTICKS 
as well. 
 
(37) FIL23 (14: may_Van) 
Situation: James is a teenager who recently got his driver’s license. He doesn’t have his own 
car, but his family owns three vehicles: a van, a sports car, and a truck. Since James is a new 
driver, his parents stipulate that he is limited to driving the van when he drives around 
town alone.  
 
Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 
 (Note: participants will only see one of the following two options, dependent on list) 
14-ONLY James may only drive the VAN without his parents; he may not drive the 
SPORTS CAR. 
14-JUST James may just drive the VAN without his parents; he may not drive the 
SPORTS CAR. 
 
(38) FIL24 (15: may_Honors) 
Situation: Belinda is a student in the honors program at her high school. To ensure fair 
treatment of all the honors students, since honors courses are in high demand, the school 
enforces a limit of one honors course per student each semester. Belinda chooses Honors 




Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 
(Note: participants will only see one of the following two options, dependent on list) 
15-ONLY Belinda may only take honors HISTORY this semester; she may not take 
honors PHYSICS. 
15-JUST Belinda may just take honors HISTORY this semester; she may not take 
honors PHYSICS. 
 
Unlike with sentence sets, each list had only one version of each exclusive filler (there were 
only two versions in total: the only version and the just version). Each list contained one just 
exclusive filler and one only exclusive filler. List A contained 13-ONLY and 14-JUST, List B contained 
13-JUST and 15-ONLY, and List C contained 14-ONLY and 15-JUST. Distributing them this way 
ensured that each exclusive filler version was seen and judged an equal number of times. This is 
why 55 filler sentences were created, but each list only contained 54 filler sentences. 
 The remaining Short Story fillers were sentences following the usual filler structure and 
containing one of three other modals: must (3 Short Story fillers), should (3 Short Story Fillers), or 
can (4 Short Story fillers). Many contained words that were inserted in some of the filler sentence 
sets (e.g. adverbs) so a savvy reader wouldn’t draw a link between the sentences with NPIs and 
exclusives and the exclusive fillers. They were also each preceded by a Situation, but unlike the 
exclusive fillers, they only had one version. The sentences following the Situations differed in their 
degree of truthfulness. Some of them logically followed from the Situation while others directly 
contradicted it. An example of one of these Short Story fillers (one that directly contracts the 





 (39) F33 (FIL-MODAL_CANdrycleaners) 
Situation: Lewis dropped some clothes off at the dry cleaners yesterday. When he was asked 
whether he could come and pick them up the next day, he told them that he was too busy, 
but could pick them up the day after. 
 
Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 
# Lewis can pick up the clothes from the dry cleaners TODAY; he can’t do it TOMORROW. 
 
 All participants saw the same 52 filler sentences with the last two filler sentences they saw 
being dependent on list (as mentioned previously, these were the exclusive fillers). (The complete 
list of fillers that were utilized in the experiment can be found in Appendix E.) 
 
4.4  Organizing stimuli in Qualtrics and pseudo-randomization 
Once the experimental items and filler items were completed, the next task was to input 
them all into the survey software and implement pseudo-randomization. As with the pilot, the final 
experiment used the Qualtrics platform. In light of the pilot participant debriefings, pseudo-
randomization was used to combat learning effects and participant fatigue applying to certain 
experimental items. A system was created in order to ensure a set number of filler sentences (i.e. 
two) between each experimental item and the lists were split in such a way that sentence pairs 
from the same sentence set would never be seen in the same half of the survey. For this, I used a 
block and randomization system within Qualtrics. The specific details for this system are as follows. 
Experimental items were divided into two blocks: α block and β block. These blocks (which 
I call “Greek Blocks”) were to help ensure that not too many parallel versions of a sentence were 
seen in close proximity to each other. I then equally allocated “A” versions (the sentence in a pair 
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that had no NPI) and “B” versions (the sentence in a pair that had an NPI) to α and β blocks, so that 
they were in complementary distribution to each other. In practice, α block received A versions of 
sentences 1-6 and B versions of sentences 7-12 while β block received B versions of sentences 1-6 
and A versions of sentences 7-12. 
Within Greek Blocks, I created 12 different sub-blocks of sentences (which I call “Duodecim 
Blocks”), each with three sentences. The second sentence of each block contained an experimental 
item. The first and third sentence were filler items. This is to ensure there were always two fillers 
between each experimental item. 
Each Greek Block received a near-equal distribution of “A” (unmodified) and “B” (modified) 
fillers. No Greek Block received both versions of the same filler sentence (in most cases, the 
opposing version appeared in the other Greek Block, excepting the versions that were used in the 
Warm-up and End fillers). α block received the even-numbered Short Story fillers (excepting F30, 
which appeared in the End fillers) and β block received the odd-numbered Context fillers 
(excepting F33, which appeared in the Warm-up fillers). Each Greek Block received one exclusive 
filler sentence apiece.  
Within Duodecim Blocks (the three-sentence blocks, ordered filler-experimental-filler), 
parallel versions of experimental items were grouped with completely different filler sentences 
(e.g. Experimental item 1A was grouped with F1B and 14-JUST, while parallel experimental item 1B 
was grouped with F21A and F16B). 3 Warm-Up fillers (WU#) and End fillers (E#) were selected to 
bookend the 24 Duodecim Blocks. Each triad group received one A version, one B version, and one 
Short Story filler. 
 With the sentences all divided into blocks, the last step was to implement the 
randomization. Qualtrics supplies randomizers which can change how the survey is presented to 
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participants. In order to get the desired effect, I created a total of three randomizers: one to 
randomize the Greek Blocks and two to randomize the Duodecim blocks.  
Randomizer 1 simply randomized the two large Greek Blocks, with the “evenly present 
elements” option checked (this ensured that an equal number of participants saw each ordering of 
Greek Blocks). The reason for this was to combat a learning effect phenomenon of specific halves 
(e.g. one Greek Block consistently getting higher ratings). Randomizers 2 and 3 randomized the 12 
Duodecim blocks within the two Greek Blocks (again, to combat a learning effect). As mentioned 
before, these Duodecim blocks were created to ensure two fillers between experimental items. (For 
a full list of all items seen in each list, complete with arrangement into Greek and Duodecim blocks, 
see Appendix H.) 
 
4.5 Presentation and distribution of survey 
 
4.5.1 Mechanical Turk details 
 
Recruitment for the survey was done through Amazon Mechanical Turk. I created three 
different Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs), one for each version. These HITs were much the same, 
only differing slightly in title (e.g. “Judging Variations of English Sentences, List A” vs. “Judging 
Variations of English Sentences, List B”) as well as survey link and survey password.  
All three versions of the HITs required Masters workers (high-performing workers as 
statistically analyzed by Mechanical Turk), meaning that workers without this “Masters” status 
could not view or accept them. The listed reward per assignment was $2.34 ($0.03 per question) 
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and they were given two hours26 to complete the request after accepting it.  The description and 
keywords for all HIT lists were as follows: 
(40) Description and Keywords for Mechanical Turk HITs 
Description: You will be redirected to a Qualtrics survey where, after a training 
session, you will be asked to judge the acceptability of English sentences on a scale 
from 1-6. Requirements: Native English Speaker (American). Estimated time to 
complete: 20-30 minutes 
Keywords: survey, experiment, English, sentence judgments, linguistics, language 
When workers previewed my HIT, they were first presented with a list of Qualifications 
which they were prompted to read before proceeding. This section outlined that workers had to be 
native speakers of American English and had to be at least 18 years of age. It also informed them 
that in order to be eligible for monetary compensation they were required to 1) only participate 
once (across all lists), 2) complete all questions within the Qualtrics survey (with no obvious signs 
of carelessness), and 3) enter their survey completion code back in Mechanical Turk (in order for 
me to match Qualtrics surveys to Mechanical Turk surveys). To signify their compliance, they had to 





                                                          
26 The time allotted per assignment was originally set for one hour, but after the first few batches, I increased 
it to two hours after I received direct feedback from a worker who told me they nearly ran out of time. 
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Figure 1: Top screenshot of Mechanical Turk HIT 
 
Figure 2: Bottom screenshot of Mechanical Turk HIT 
 
Below the verification section, they were then given a link to the Qualtrics survey (as well as 
the password for the survey). These survey links and passwords differed, depending on which 
version (A, B, or C) the HIT was for. Below the links and passwords, a text box was provided for 
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them to enter their survey completion code when they had finished. This survey code was 
generated by the Qualtrics survey. 
Figure 3: Completion code entry 
 
 In addition to the visible aspects of the survey, there were also some parts in the code of the 
survey that the user was unaware of. Using Foster’s techniques (Foster 2015), I used Unique Turker 
(Ott 2013) to generate a script that would prevent the same Mechanical Turk worker ID from 
accessing other versions or batches of my HIT. This method, though handy, can still be 
circumvented by savvy workers, so I had to also individually check my workers as results came in 
to ensure that no two surveys were completed by the same worker. 
Between all lists run, only four workers’ HIT submissions were rejected (one for List B and 
three for List C). Three were rejected for not agreeing to the terms on the Mechanical Turk survey 
and one was rejected for scoring most sentences on the entire 78 question survey with the highest 
rating of a “6.” Rejected participants did not receive compensation and none of their data was used 
in the experiment. For the remaining 90 participants who were accepted, they were compensated 
the advertised amount of $2.34. While each HIT was set to auto-approve and pay workers within 7 
days (as mentioned previously), I manually approved or rejected each individual worker’s 




4.5.2 Qualtrics details 
 The survey itself was conducted wholly in Qualtrics. When a participant clicked on the link 
from the Mechanical Turk assignment, they were brought to a version of my experiment. They were 
prompted for a password, which was version specific and was simply used to ensure that other 
people (i.e. not from Mechanical Turk) would not accidentally stumble upon my survey and begin 
filling it out.  
 The survey was divided into five major sections: information and consent, demographics 
questions, instructions and tutorial, sentence rating questions, and survey completion. The 
information and consent section explained to the participants that this was a research study and 
that they would have to give informed consent in order for their responses to be utilized. After that 
they were given the full IRB-approved consent form (see Appendix G) which they were expected to 
read and keep a copy for their records. Below the consent form was the first question of the survey 
which had two radio buttons for them to pick between:  
(41) Consent Question for Survey 
Select an option below to give your informed consent for this survey. You must give 
consent for me to utilize your response. Please do not continue with this survey if you 
decline to give informed consent. 
YES: I have read the above information and give my consent to the terms outlined 
within it. 
NO: I have read the above information and do NOT give my consent to the terms 
outlined within it. 
 
 This was a forced-choice survey question, meaning that they could not proceed until they 
had selected either “YES” or “NO.” 
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 Next, the participants were presented with three demographics questions, which were 
selected for possible use when analyzing the data. Participants were asked to fill in a text box with 
their age, pick from three identified gender options (“Male,” “Female,” or “Other”), and fill in a text 
box with the geographical state (e.g. “New York” or “Texas”) that they felt contributed the most to 
the way they currently speak English. These demographics questions were not forced choice, 
meaning that participants could choose to decline to answer if they wished. All compensated 
participants, however, filled out all demographics questions. 
 The instructions and tutorial section detailed critical information of how participants 
should process the sentences of the experiment. It explained how some sentences would be 
preceded with a “Situation” (these were the Short Story questions) and some would not. For the 
sentences with a given situation, participants were expected to evaluate them both on their 
grammatical acceptability and their truthfulness. For sentences without a situation, they were 
simply asked to evaluate them on their grammatical acceptability. The instructions also explained 
that capitalized letters were to indicate emphasis (either by verbal stress or a louder voice) and 
pointed out that though some sentences may appear very similar, they were expected to evaluate 
them all individually. Five tutorial sentences were provided (four without situations and one with 
an accompanying situation) with the same rating scale (1-6) as the non-tutorial sentences. Four of 
these tutorial questions were followed by explanations of what type of rating was expected as well 
as the rationale behind that rating. (For the complete instructions and list of tutorial questions, see 
Appendix H.) 
 The sentence rating section directly followed the instructions and tutorial section and 
comprised the majority of the survey. Questions were presented one at a time, each on their own 
individual screen. Each screen featured a sentence followed by a reminder of what they were being 
asked to do (i.e. choose a rating for their acceptability judgment with 1 being “Completely 
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Unacceptable” and 6 being “Completely Acceptable”). Emoji faces accompanied the rating numbers 
as an easy reminder of what level of acceptability each given number was expected to imply. An 
example screen of one of these sentence question screens can be seen below in Figure 4: 
  




 Each sentence rating question was forced-choice, meaning that participants could not 
proceed to the next screen before rating the sentence. Participants could only choose to go forward 
in the survey (never back) and there was no progress bar to indicate how close they were to the 
end of the survey. 
 The last section of the survey was survey completion. Here, participants were informed that 
they had completed all questions and given a completion code (a randomized 5-digit number 
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created by Qualtrics). They were prompted to copy this code back into their Mechanical Turk HIT 
request and, once done, complete the Qualtrics survey. 
 
5 Experiment Results and Analyses 
 
The following section details the results of the experiment as well as the statistical analyses. The 
data reported and analyzed utilizes all 90 compensated experiment participants since no 
participant’s mean was beyond 1.5 times the interquartile range above the third quartile or below 
the first quartile (M = 4.59, SD = 1.54).  
Based on the results of the pilot and my experiment design, these were my predictions for 
the experiment prior to viewing the results and analyzing the data: 
(42) Experiment Predictions 
Prediction 1: Participants will find the JUST and ONLY versions of the NO-NPI (A version) 
sentences more or less equally acceptable 
Prediction 2: Participants will find the JUST versions of the NPI (B version) sentences 
markedly worse than ONLY versions. 
Prediction 3: Participants who, on average, judge the JUST versions of the NPI (B version) 
sentences to be more acceptable will also find the JUST versions of the exclusive fillers to be 
more acceptable 





The data were prepared utilizing the following parameters: 
(43) Data parameters 
 Participant identifier: a unique identifier  
 List: Which of the three lists the participant saw (A, B, or C) 
 Full Identifier: A unique identifier for each sentence.  
 Rating: The rating the participant gave this sentence on a scale from 1 (Completely 
Unacceptable) to 6 (Completely Acceptable). 
 Sentence Set: What sentence set the sentence belonged to (1 – 12, for 12 sentence 
sets) 
 Version: Whether this sentence was a NEG, ONLY, or JUST sentence 
 NPI or no NPI: Whether the sentence contained an NPI or not. 
 Any or Ever: If the sentence contained an NPI, whether that NPI was any or ever. If 
the sentence did not contain an NPI, it was marked as N/A. 
The data used in the following analyses consisted of ratings of all 24 experimental sentences by 
each participant for a total of 2160 ratings. 
 Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the ratings by sentence version and 







Table 1: Means (standard deviations) of ratings by version and NPI category 
Descriptively, there are several points to note. First is that the NEG version had the highest 
rating mean in all three NPI categories. This is as expected – all NEG versions were intended to be 
completely acceptable grammatical. What this same comparison demonstrates, however, is that the 
rating mean is higher for ONLY than JUST in all three categories as well. Furthermore, whereas 
there’s not a very large difference between ONLY + no NPI (M= 5.16) and JUST + no NPI (M= 
4.82), there’s a sizeable rating mean difference between their NPI counterparts: ONLY + any’s M = 
4.04 compared to JUST + any’s M = 3.39 and even more drastic, ONLY + ever’s M = 4.03 to JUST + 
ever’s M = 2.92. If we were to divide the six-point scale into a binary judgment of “acceptable” vs. 
“unacceptable” (with <3.5 being unacceptable and >3.5 being acceptable), both of JUST’s NPI 
versions would fall on the unacceptable side, whereas JUST without an NPI and all three iterations 
of ONLY would be on the acceptable side. 
 I also analyzed the same data using a 2x2 design, where I dropped the NEG data and only 
looked at whether the sentence had an NPI or not (i.e. I treated any and ever as the same category). 
When any and ever were analyzed together as NPIs, the rating mean for ONLY + NPI (M = 4.04, SD 
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For all of my statistical analyses, I used R (R Core Team 2012) and lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker 
and Walker 2015). I ran a total of four models (two 3x3 and two 2x2) and one correlation. 
 
5.2.1 3x3 Linear Mixed Effects Analysis 
The 3x3 linear mixed effects analyses looked at the relationship between rating and version, 
one with interaction (the “full model”) and one without interaction (“model without interaction”). 
As fixed effects, I used version and NPI category (no NPI, any, or ever), and their interaction term, in 
the full model. As random effects, for participant and sentence set, I used random intercepts and 
slopes for version, NPI category, and the interaction between version and NPI category. Table 2 
shows the fixed effects for this model, with the intercept (Intr.) representing JUST, no NPI. 
Version * NPI Category Estimate Std. Error Deg. Of Freedom t value p value 





NEG : any 
NEG : ever 
ONLY : any 
ONLY : ever  
4.82      
0.39  
0.34    
-1.48  
-1.85     
1.38 
1.26   
0.31   
0.77                           
0.114 
0.112   
0.084    
0.159   
0.172  





22.91      
97.37    
100.48   
99.27 
119.19    
102.62    
112.36    
117.15    
42.15   
3.50   
4.07 
-9.32 
-10.76   
7.33 
6.35 
1.88   
5.09 
p < 0.001 
p < 0.01 
p < 0.001 
p < 0.001 
p <0.001 
p < 0.001 
p < 0.001 
p = 0.062 
p < 0.001 
Table 2: Mixed effects analysis of model: Rating ~ Version * NPIcategory + (1 + Version * 
NPIcategory | Participant) + (1 + Version * NPIcategory | Sentence) 
47 
 
As Table 2 indicates, each main effect was a significant predictor as was the interaction between 
version and NPI category with the exception of one level combination (ONLY : any, where the p 
value was marginal at 0.062).  
 For the model without the interaction, I used version and NPI category as fixed effects, 
without their interaction term, in the model. As in the full model, I used random intercepts and 
slopes for version, NPI category, and the interaction between version and NPI category as random 
effects for participant and sentence set. Table 3 shows the fixed effects for this model, with the 
intercept (Intr.) representing JUST, no NPI . 
Version + NPI Category Estimate Std. Error Deg. Of Freedom t value p value 






0.65   
0.46  
-0.48   
-0.68              




0.102    
 26.70   
18.07    
51.43   
203.91   
118.04  





p < 0.001 
p < 0.001 
p < 0.001 
p < 0.001 
p < 0.001 
Table 3: Mixed effects analysis of model: Rating ~ Version + NPIcategory + (1 + Version * 
NPIcategory | Participant) + (1 + Version * NPIcategory | Sentence) 
 
This reduced model shows both main effects to be significant (p < 0.001 for each level).  
When the full model and the model without the interaction were compared (using ANOVA), 
the difference was statistically significant (χ2 (4) = 58.593, p < 0.001), with the full model (AIC = 
6934.3) being favored over the model without the interaction (AIC = 6984.8).  
The 3x3 models show a promising story, one where version is a significant main effect and 
NPI category is a significant main effect. We also see a significant interaction between version and 
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NPI category, since the full model with the interaction was a better fit to the data than the model 
without the interaction. The reader will note, however, that these models distinguish between any 
and ever, when the theory and predictions were based on NPIs in general. To more directly address 
this issue, I tested a second set of models. 
 
5.2.2 2x2 Linear Mixed Effects Analysis 
The 2x2 linear mixed effects analyses also examined the relationship between rating and 
version, but with only two versions (JUST and ONLY) and two NPI conditions. I trimmed the data to 
exclude the NEG version (since, as mentioned in the methodology, it was mostly there to act as a 
control27) and simplified the NPI conditions to the presence or lack of an NPI (c.f. with the prior 
models with three conditions: no NPI, any or ever). These analyses are more directly relevant for 
our purposes as they enable us to look at the NPIs as one category instead of two. The theory posits 
that both of these weak NPIs should uniformly either be licensed or unlicensed by just and only. 
Like the 3x3 analyses, I ran one model with the interaction (the “full model”) and one 
without (“the model without interaction”). As fixed effects, I used version and NPI category (no NPI 
and NPI), and their interaction term, in the full model. As random effects, for participant and 
sentence set, I used random intercepts and slopes for version, NPI category, and the interaction 
between version and NPI category. Table 4 shows the fixed effects for this model, with the intercept 
(Intr.) representing JUST, no NPI . 
 
 
                                                          
27 This model also would not converge with the inclusion of the NEG data – likely due to the differences 
between NEG + ever and NEG + any ratings.  
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Version * NPI Category Estimate Std. Error Deg. Of Freedom t value p value 




















p < 0.001 
p < 0.001 
p < 0.001 
p < 0.001 
Table 4: Mixed effects analysis of model: Rating ~ Version * NPIcategory + (1 + Version * 
NPIcategory | Participant) + (1 + Version * NPIcategory | Sentence) 
For the 2x2 model without interaction, I used version and NPI category, without interaction term, in 
the model as fixed effects. For the random effect of participant, I used random intercepts and slopes 
for version, NPI category, and their interaction term. Table 5 shows the fixed effects for this model, 
with the intercept (Intr.) representing JUST, no NPI.  
Version + NPI Category Estimate Std. Error Deg. Of Freedom t value p value 















p < 0.001 
p < 0.001 
p < 0.001 
Table 5: Mixed effects analysis of model: Rating ~ Version + NPIcategory + (1 + Version * 
NPIcategory | Participant) + (1 + Version * NPIcategory | Sentence) 
When the full model and the model without interaction were compared (using ANOVA), the 
difference was statistically significant (χ2(1) = 16.852, p < 0.001), with the full model (AIC = 
4776.2) being favored over the model without the interaction (AIC = 4791.0).  
The findings are exciting for multiple reasons. First, the 2x2 full model analysis revealed a 
significant main effect for version (adjusting from JUST to ONLY: p < 0.001). It also revealed a 
significant main effect for NPI category (adjusting from JUST + no NPI to JUST + NPI: p < 0.001). 
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Together, these findings directly support Prediction 2, as these numbers represent a large degree of 
confidence that these two predictors are the source of the variance in the means.  When compared 
with the model without the interaction, the full model with the interaction was a significantly better 
fit to the data, giving us a significant interaction between version and NPI category (p < 0.001). 
Tukey post hoc tests indicated that there was no significant difference between JUST + 
noNPI and ONLY + noNPI. This corresponds to Prediction 1; there was no reason we expected there 
to be a significant difference between these two groupings of ratings, as we expected participants to 
find them more or less equally acceptable. The significant difference that was expected does bear 
out: the model revealed a significant difference between JUST + noNPI and JUST + NPI (p < 0.001). 
All of the Tukey pairwise comparisons are shown in Table 6 below: 
Tukey Comparison Estimate Std. Error z value p value 
JUST: noNPI – JUST:NPI == 0 
ONLY: NPI – JUST:NPI == 0 
ONLY: noNPI – JUST:NPI == 0 
ONLY:NPI –JUST:noNPI == 0 
ONLY: noNPI –JUST:noNPI == 0 



















p < 0.001 
p < 0.001 
p < 0.001 
p < 0.001 
p > 0.6 
p < 0.001 
Table  6: Tukey pairwise comparisons for Rating ~ Version * NPIcategory + (1 + Version * 
NPIcategory | Participant) + (1 + Version * NPIcategory | Sentence) model 
The reader will note that there was also a significant difference between ONLY + noNPI and 
ONLY + NPI, which was not necessarily expected, but neither confirms or disproves the established 
predictions. 
 The significant main effects and the significant interaction allow us to directly compare the 
relative difference between ratings. The difference between noNPI and NPI for ONLY (5.16 - 4.04 = 
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1.12) was smaller than it was for JUST (4.82 - 3.16 = 1.66). This means that overall participants 
found there to be a bigger difference between the two NPI categories of the JUST versions than the 
ONLY versions, which is as expected under Prediction 2. This supports the overarching theory that 
just and only have different behavior patterns when interacting with NPIs. 
6 The Experimental Findings Applied to the Theory  
 
 We now have concrete data supporting the theory that while only can license NPIs, just 
cannot. None of the prior semantic literature can account for these findings, leading me to propose 
my own theory regarding the structures and semantics of these two different exclusives. Before we 
turn to that, though, we must understand how NPI licensing is analyzed in the current literature 
and how differences in modal/scope interactions contribute to this discussion. 
 
6.1 Downward entailing environments as NPI licensers 
 
Now we must ask the question of what constitutes a valid NPI licenser. Fauconnier (1975) 
and Ladusaw (1979) propose that NPIs are licensed under a specific environment, called a 
“downward entailing” (also known as “downward monotone”) or DE environment. NPI licensers 
create these DE environments28: 
(44) a. Downward Monotonicity: The expression α occurs in a simple downward 
monotone position of the sentence ϕ iff for any β which is stronger than α, ϕ entails 
ϕ [α / β]. If α is a set-denoting term, then a stronger term would be a narrower one 
(i.e. one denoting a subset). If α is a proposition, then strength means logical 
                                                          
28 This condition has been widely adopted as the standard for NPI licensing (among others: Krifka 1990; von 
Fintel 1999; Beaver & Clark 2008) and as such has played an important role in my research on this matter. 
52 
 
strength, so β ranges over expressions that entail α, e.g. a conjunction containing α 
as one conjunct. 
 b. Example: John did not eat lunch with Mary  John did not eat lunch with Mary 
and Bob (Conjoined phrase Mary and Bob is stronger than Mary) 
(45) a. Upward Monotonicity: The expression α occurs in an upward monotone position 
of a sentence ϕ iff for any β which is weaker than α, ϕ entails ϕ [α /β]. 
b. Example: Tim ate carrots  Tim ate vegetables (vegetables is weaker than 
carrots, as carrots is a subset of vegetables) 
(Definitions, but not examples, in (21) and (22)provided by Beaver & Clark 2008) 
 (46) NPI being licensed by negation 
a. Tim did not eat any vegetables 
Demonstration of DE environment 
b.  Tim did not eat vegetables  Tim did not eat carrots 
 
 (47) NPI being licensed by negation  
a. Oliver hasn’t ever visited Europe 
Demonstration of DE environment 
 b. Oliver hasn’t visited Europe  Oliver hasn’t visited France  
 
(48) NPI not being licensed 
a. * Tim ate any vegetables 
Demonstration of non-DE environment 




In (46a), we see that NPI any is licit in this environment. (46b) demonstrates that it is 
permissible there since the environment is downward monotone. If carrots is substituted for 
vegetables (substituting a subset for a set), we see that the original sentence (with the NPI 
removed) “Tim did not eat vegetables” entails the new sentence “Tim did not eat carrots.” (47a) 
and (47b) demonstrate a similar phenomenon with NPI ever. Sentence (48a), “Tim ate any 
vegetables,” is an unacceptable sentence, however. (48b) shows that in this case the environment is 
not downward entailing; “Tim ate vegetables” does not entail “Tim ate carrots” (Tim could have 
eaten another kind of vegetable, such as beets).  
 
6.2 Downward entailing environments, ‘only,’ and ‘just’ 
 
Now that the traits of a valid NPI licenser (under a traditional semantic account of NPIs) 
have been clearly defined, we can more carefully examine only and just in regard to NPI licensing. It 
turns out that only  does not create a simple downward monotone environment, which is 
problematic, since only can license NPIs (though, crucially, they must be located outside of the focus 
associate29). Below are two examples of only licensing NPIs in a clearly non-DE environment: 
 (49) a. Only [Vincent]F has ever visited Europe. 
b. Only Vincent has visited Europe ⇏ Only Vincent has visited Spain. 
                                                          
29 When NPIs appear within the focus associate of only in grammatical sentences, it has been posited that they 
are licit for some reason other than the presence of only (Horn 1996; Beaver & Clark 2008). This has been 
theorized because only can be removed in these cases and still produce a grammatical sentence. For example: 
(i) Only people who have ever had a debilitating illness themselves can appreciate what an 
ordeal this was. 
(Linebarger 1987) 
(ii) People who have ever had a debilitating illness themselves can appreciate what an ordeal 
this was. 




 (50)      a. Isabel only [texts]F any of her friends on weekends. (i.e. she doesn’t do  
anything more than text them, such as call them or visit them) 
b. Isabel only texts her friends on weekends ⇏ Isabel only texts her friends on 
Saturdays. 
Examples (49a) and (50a) are acceptable English sentences, but (49b) and (50b) 
demonstrate that if we apply the same downward monotonicity test from examples (46) – (48), it 
does not appear that these are downward entailing environments. The presuppositions of the (b) 
examples are not entailed by the presuppositions of the (a) examples. If, in a given context of a 
group of people, Vincent is the only person who has visited Europe, it doesn’t necessarily follow 
that he is the only one who has visited Spain (a country contained completely within Europe, so the 
set of individuals that have visited Spain is a subset of the individuals that have visited Europe). He 
could have visited Europe without visiting Spain at all. Similarly, if Isabel only texts her friends on 
weekends, it doesn’t necessarily follow that she only texts them on Saturdays. She could text them 
on Sundays and not Saturdays, and (50a) would still be true. 
 It is this kind of puzzle that led von Fintel (1999) to propose what he calls “Strawson 
Entailment:” 
 (51) Strawson Downward Entailment 
  A function ƒ of type <σ, τ> is Strawson-DE 
  iff for all β, α of type σ such that β  α and ƒ(β) is defined: ƒ(α)  ƒ(β) 
         (von Fintel, 1999) 
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Strawson Downward Entailment (SDE) is a condition on downward entailment utilized 
when checking the monotonicity as outlined in (44a) above. It is weaker than standard DE due to 
the fact that all DE environments are SDE environments, but not all SDE environments are DE 
environments. In effect, it checks for downward entailment (ƒ(α)  ƒ(β)) with the added condition 
that the conclusion (ƒ(β))is defined (recall that the presupposition of ONLY(S) was the condition on 
S being defined in our Horn/Rooth account of only in Section 2.2). It predicts NPI licensers such as 
only to be downward monotone in this broader sense as well as the NPI licensers that had no 
erroneous predictions under standard downward monotonicity (e.g. forms of negation).  
While a SDE account of NPI licensing may explain why only can license NPIs (even when in 
subject position), it is still problematic for just. Like only, just appears to be downward monotone 
given Strawson downward monotonicity30, but they differ in regard to Negative Polarity Item (NPI) 
licensing.  This is a complication, because if just is assumed to have the same structure as only and 
SDE is assumed to be the condition on NPI licensing, just should be able to license NPIs as well. Now 
to repeat the SDE test on sentence (50a), replacing only with just: 
(52) # Isabel just [texts]F any of her friends on weekends. (i.e. she doesn’t do anything 
more than text them, such as call them or visit them) 
(53) a. β  α: Saturdays  weekends (Saturdays, β, is a subset of weekends, α) 
 b. ƒ(β) is defined: Isabel texts her friends on Saturdays. 
 c. ƒ(α): Isabel texts her friends on weekends 
 ∴ Isabel just texts her friends on Saturdays (ƒ(α)  ƒ(β)) 
                                                          
30 Also anti-additive, given Strawson anti-additivity (Gajewski, 2011); however, anti-additivity is utilized for 
strong NPIs, which is outside of the scope of this paper. 
 (i) A function F of type <σ, τ> is anti-additive iff for all x,y of type σ: 
F(x ∨ y) ↔ F(x) ∧ F(y) 
 (ii) A function F of type <σ, τ> is Strawson anti-additive (SAA) iff for all x, y of type σ:  
F(x ∨ y) ↔S F(x) ∧ F(y) 




 As (53) demonstrates, just is capable of producing a SDE environment, just like only. This is 
a problem, since just is apparently not an NPI licenser (as exhibited in (20)). Two possible 
conclusions immediately arise from this realization: 
 (54) Possible conclusions from NPI observations: 
Conclusion 1 (Strong): NPI licensing is not determined by DE (or, if following von 
Fintel 1999, SDE) environments 
Conclusion 1 (Weak): NPI licensing by only is not determined by SDE environments 
Conclusion 2: just and only have different structures: only creates a DE (or, if 
following von Fintel 1999, SDE) environment, just does not.  
 
 Conclusion 1 (combined weak and strong) is undesirable because pursuing it forces us to 
follow one of two problematic paths: the strong version or weak version. The first option (strong 
version) concludes that only and all other NPI licensers license NPIs in the same manner, and that 
manner is not reliant on DE or SDE environments. This would force us to find an entirely different 
way to account for all the NPI licensing data, directly disagreeing with the widely accepted theory 
established by Fauconnier (1975) and Ladusaw (1979). The second option (weak version) 
concludes only does not license NPIs through DE or SDE environments, but other NPI licensers do. 
This option is no less problematic, since treating only as different from all other NPI licensers also 
goes against much of the work that has been done on NPIs and their licensers since Fauconnier 
(1975) and Ladusaw (1979). 
Conclusion 2 is a much more conservative claim which does not inherently run counter to a 
well-established theory of NPI licensing. Before outlining my theory (which follows Conclusion 2) 
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in section 6.4, I will first turn to the other difference between only and just that has motivated my 
theory: the divergence of only and just when interacting with modals. 
 
 
6.3 Modal/scope interaction differences 
 Another striking difference between just and only is the way they interact with modals. Just 
and only differ in their scope behavior when combined with modals, which is also unpredicted, 
given their number of similarities. Only displays scope behaviors very similar to negation31: 
sometimes the modal scopes higher than only/negation, sometimes lower. Just, on the other hand, 
appears to always scope under the modal in the interpretation of a sentence that contains both just 
and a modal. 
The examples below demonstrate the scope behavior of negation, only, and just when 
combined with several modals. All modals should be read deontically (permission reading), not 
epistemically (possibility reading): 
 
Scope of Modals and Just/Only: comparison of scope behavior of negation, just, and only with 
modals ought to, should, need to, should, may, and can: 
 
                                                          
31 The scope relations of negation and modals are an ongoing topic of research. Some deontic modals (e.g. can, 
may) take scope under negation while others (e.g. need to, must, ought to, should) take scope over negation. 
The data are puzzling because some of the scope relations are representative of their Phonological Form (PF), 
but others are reversed.  There is also no obvious correlation between modal type and behavior (e.g. it is not 
the case that universal deontic modals behave one way and existential deontic modals behave another). 
There are various theories for the data, including Cormack & Smith (2002), Iatridou & Zeijlstra (2013), and 
Homer (2015). All have their own differing accounts of this puzzling phenomenon. For our purposes, it is 
enough to observe that only’s scope relations mirror that of negation’s scope relations.  
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(55)  Negation (not) 
  a. John ought to not eat bread.   modal > negation 
b. John need to not eat bread.   modal > negation 
  c. John should not eat bread.   modal > negation 
  d. John may not eat bread.   negation > modal  
(also modal > negation) 
  e. John can not eat bread32.   negation > modal 
(also modal > negation) 
  
 
 (56)  Exclusive only 
a. John ought to only eat [bread]F.  modal > only 
  b. John need to only eat [bread]F.  modal > only 
  c. John should only eat [bread]F.  modal > only 
  d. John may only eat [bread]F.   only > modal 
        (also modal > only) 
  e. John can only eat [bread]F.   only > modal 
        (also modal > only) 
         
(57) Exclusive just 
  a. You ought to just eat [bread]F.  modal > just 
  b. You need to just eat [bread]F.  modal > just 
  c. You should just eat [bread]F.   modal > just 
  d. You may just eat [bread]F.   modal > just33 
                                                          
32 Note that the modal can and negation must be separated (i.e. not joined together to form the contraction 
cannot,) to get both possible scopes. Thanks to Janet D. Fodor (p.c.) for reminding us of this fact. 
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  e. You can just eat [bread]F.   modal > just34 
 
For the modals ought to, need to, and should, the only available scope interpretation is the 
modal scoping above negation/exclusive in (55) – (57); however, may and can differ. When paired 
with negation or only, both scope relationships are available for two possible interpretations. One 
of the interpretations is the surface scope, as expected, but the other interpretation is that of the 
inverse scope (with the NEG/only scoping over the modal). When paired with just, only the modal 
> exclusive interpretation is available, just like all of the other modals. This suggests that just is not 
able to demonstrate inverse scope, even with the modals that are known to support it. To compare 
one of the modals across sentences containing negation, only, and just, let us look at the (e) 
examples, which contain the modal can. This is produced below with full interpretations, for the 
reader’s convenience: 
 
(58) a.  John can not eat bread35.  
Interpretation 1:John is unable to eat bread   (NEG > can) 
Interpretation 2: John is allowed to not eat bread   (can > NEG) 
b. John can only eat BREAD 
Interpretation 1: The one thing John can eat is bread (only > can) 
Interpretation 2: John is allowed to eat bread and nothing else if he wants to.  
(can > only) 
c. John can just eat BREAD 
Blocked interpretation: The one thing John can eat is bread 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
33 The modal > just scope interpretation appears to be the majority intuition, though some speakers are able to 
force a just > modal reading. It’s important to note, however, that even for these speakers, this reading is less 
salient than the other reading as well as marginal in its grammaticality. 
34 See previous note. 
35 Refer back to footnote 21   
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(just > can) 
Interpretation: John is allowed to eat bread and nothing else if he wants to. 
(can > just) 
 
(58a) – (58c) only differ by one word: (58a) contains not, (58b) contains only, and (58c) 
contains just.  The interpretations of (58a) – (58c) differ in that (58a) and (58b) have two 
interpretations (modal scoping over negation/exclusive and negation/exclusive scoping over 
modal) and (58c) only has one (modal scoping over exclusive). The interpretation that (58c) is 
missing is Interpretation 1 of (58b). While some native English speakers are able to force that 
interpretation onto (58c), it is substantially less salient than in the (58b) case.  
Another interesting similarity can be seen when observing the modal need. Need is different 
than need to in its lack of inflectional morphology and its behavior of occurring before negation. 
(59) a. John need not eat bread   (NEG > need) 
 b. John need only eat [bread]F   (only > need) 
 c. * John need just eat [bread]F 
English modal need is a special case of a universal deontic modal that is required to be 
interpreted inside the scope of negation (Iatridou & Zeijlstra 2013)36. In the case of (59a), the 
interpretation is that it is not the case that John is required to eat bread. The interpretation is not its 
surface representation of John is required to not eat bread.  Similarly, in (59b), the interpretation is 
the one thing John is required to eat is bread. It does not follow the surface representation of John is 
required to eat bread and nothing else. Sentence (59c) is ungrammatical, for possibly more than 
                                                          
36 Iatridou & Zeijlstra 2013 also list some other modals that have this unique behavior, such as Dutch hoeven 
and German brauchen.  
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one reason. First, as observed above, just is reluctant to participate in inverse scope interpretations. 
Second, the modal need is commonly considered to be an NPI (Iatridou & Zeijlstra 2013, Van de 
Wouden 1994) and the experimental data supports the intuition that just cannot license NPIs.  
These observations of only and just’s differing modal scope interactions combined with the 
previous observation of only’s ability to license NPIs provide strong motivation for a theory in 
which only has more in common with negation (be it similarity in structure and/or semantics) than 
just. A theory where only is in part formed by negation would facilitate in explaining why the two 
have so much in common in regard to their scope behavior with modals. It also might help account 
for the NPI-licensing differences between only and just since negation creates a DE environment, as 
we saw in 1.3.1. Von Fintel and Iatridou (2007), henceforth vF&I, propose a split account of only 
where the exclusive is made up of negation and an exceptive phrase. This type of approach fits the 
aforementioned criteria of explaining the negation-like property that only has that just doesn’t.  
 
6.4. My theory on the different structure and semantics of ‘only’ and ‘just’ 
 
While many linguists have adopted some version of Horn’s (1969) theory of only, a very 
different theory of only is posited by vF&I (2007). This is the theory on which I have based my own.  
In their article, they propose that the scope of only splits into NEG + EXCEPTIVE (shortened to 
EXC), making it a “negative split” phenomenon37.  This terminology simply means that a single word 
is actually two elements semantically, with one of those elements being negation. In this section, I 
will discuss vF&I’s theory, explain how I modified it into my own theory to account for the exclusive 
differences outlined in Section 1.3, and then demonstrate its application with regard to the NPI and 




modal/scope interaction differences. It should be noted that this theory is incomplete, as there are 
both clear advantages and clear disadvantages to it (which will be outlined). 
 
6.4.1. Negative split and its application for ‘only’ 
 
The idea of negative split is attributed to Jacobs (1980), where it was utilized for splitting 
negative determiners (such as no) into two elements: negation and an existential quantifier (with 
negation taking wider scope over the quantifier)38. The data that led vF&I (2007) to propose a 
negative split account for only concerns a specific usage of only: in sentences that they call 
sufficiency modal constructions (SMCs). SMCs are observed to be used in very specific scenarios. An 
example of an SMC in English is as follows: 
 (60) To get good cheese, you only have to go to the North End!  (vF&I, 2007) 
 
In SMCs, only appears before a modal, but if our assumptions about the prejacent (following 
Horn, 1969) are maintained, incorrect presuppositions are predicted: 
                                                          
38 Evidence for negative split mostly comes from examples in German and Dutch, where negation appears to be 
taking scope over another scopal element (such as a modal), with the existential quantifier scoping below that 
element: 
(i) Dutch (Rullman, 1995): 
Ze  hoeven geen  verpleegkundige  te  onstlann 
 They need  no  nurse    to  fire 
a. # It is necessary that they fire no nurse 
 b. For no nurse x does the following hold: it is necessary that they fire x 
 c. It is not necessary that they fire a nurse. 
(ii) English (Heim, 2001) 
I need no secretary. 
   Reading 1: It is not the case that I need a secretary 
   Reading 2: I need to not have a secretary. 
 I need to have no secretary. 
  Reading: It is not the case that I need to have a secretary. 




 (61)  P: To get good cheese, you have to go to the North End. 
A: There is no place that is not the North End that you have to go to get good cheese. 
 
The prejacent created by a Horn/Rooth account of only is certainly not a correct 
presupposition to an SMC. vF&I call this observed disconnect in meaning and compositional 
analysis of SMCs “the Prejacent Problem” and appealed to a split account of only in order to solve 
this issue. 
When considering only, the idea of applying negative split doesn’t seem unreasonable; it’s 
often easy to paraphrase only as some form of negation and except/but with an existential 
quantifier (which translates to someone or anyone) intervening. This is demonstrated in (62): 
 
(62) a. John only invited [Beth]F to the movie. 
b. It is not the case that John invited anyone except Beth to the movie. 
 
c. John only invited Beth to the [movie]F. 
d. It is not the case that John invited Beth to anything except the movie. 
 
e. Only [Beth]F went to the movie. 
f. It is not the case that anyone except Beth went to the movie. 
 
 
As for the exceptive component of only, the exceptive proposed by vF&I is a special kind of 
exceptive, called the “QUE-phrase.” The “QUE” label comes from the French ne…que construction 
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(the French equivalent to only) and is pronounced accordingly. In English, vF&I translate QUE as 
“other than.” Essentially, what they are proposing is that only in English can be translated along the 
same lines as ne…que in French, meaning that “I only like John” can be translated to “It is not the 
case that I like anyone other than John” (informally broken down, piece-by-piece from English: 
“NEG I like ∃x QUE John”)  
Semantically, QUE is an existential quantifier that scopes over alternatives. For example, 
“QUE John” introduces an existential quantifier over individuals other than John. The formula for 
the QUE-phrase is as follows, as well as an example of the assertion and presupposition of a QUE-
phrase39: 
 
 (63)  ⟦QUE John⟧ = λQ.∃x(x ≠ John and Q(x) = 1) 
 
 (64) (QUE John) Q 
   P: Q(John) = 1 (stronger version) OR  
∃x(Q(x) = 1) (weaker version) 
A: ∃y(y ≠ John & Q(y) = 1) 
          (vF&I, 2007) 
 
Splitting only into two elements allows for the scope to be split as well. This is the key in 
addressing the Prejacent Problem. In the case of vF&I’s prototypical SMC (“To get good cheese, you 
only have to go to the North End”), NEG follows the subject you and the QUE-phrase is an existential 
quantifier that scopes over the VP [go to the North End]. The modal have to intervenes between the 
NEG and EXC, creating the scope of NEG > have to > QUE (in English: “it is not the case that you 
have to do anything other than — or in this case,  logically stronger than — go to the North End”). 
                                                          
39 Note that in (39) and (40), the predicate variable “Q” has been used instead of the more common “P” so as 
to not confuse the variable with the “P” that stands for “presupposition.” 
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This correctly predicts the observed reading of an SMC, provided that the weaker of the two 
potential presuppositions is used (i.e. ∃x(P(x) = 1)40. To revisit their original SMC example: 
 
(65) A comparison of a non-split Horn/Rooth account vs. the split account of only for SMCs: 
To get good cheese, you only have to go to the North End!   
 
a. Non-split Horn/Rooth account 
ONLY [to get good cheese you have to go to [the North End]]  
P: In all worlds where you get good cheese, you have to go to the North End. 
A: In all of the worlds where you get good cheese, there is nothing stronger 
you have to do than go to the North End. 
 
 
b. vF&I split account 
To get good cheese you NEG have to QUE [go to the North End]  
P: In all worlds where you get good cheese, you have to do something. 
A: In some of the worlds where you get good cheese, you don’t have to go 
anywhere other than the North End. 
 
Note that since the vF&I split account utilizes a weak presupposition, it no longer 
incorrectly predicts what needs to happen in order to satisfy the conditions of an SMC. It 
presupposes that you have to do something and asserts that going to the North End is a sufficient, 
but not necessary, way of acquiring good cheese.          
                                                          
40 This weaker existential presupposition of only was proposed by Horn (1996). 
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Another motivation for only to be split into NEG + EXC is based on cross-linguistic data. 
vF&I divide the languages that exhibit SMCs into two categories: NEG + EXC languages (like French, 
which has the aforementioned ne…que construction) and only languages (like English). If only 
could be classified as a covert NEG + EXC, vF&I reason, then that would be a huge step towards 
making the SMC phenomenon a more unified and universal phenomenon. 
 
6.4.2. The structure and semantics for negative split ‘only’ 
 
Instead of following a traditional Horn (1969)/Rooth (1985, 1992) theory of the structure 
of only, I follow vF&I’s (2007) split account of only, where only is made up of NEG and a special 
kind of exceptive, QUE. I propose a split structure of only which is composed of NEG and QUE, as 
vF&I did, but with a crucial difference: I posit that the final scope has NEG scoping over QUE, rather 
than QUE scoping over NEG, as vF&I originally theorized. This structure also permits us to return to 
a Ladusaw-Fauconnier theory of NPI-licensing, with the NEG component of only creating a simple 
DE environment in which NPIs are licit. I will argue that it is this structure which creates the 
observed differences of NPI licensing and modal scope interactions for only and just. 
 For only we use the same type of exceptive (QUE) that vF&I (2007) utilized41.  We assume 
that “John only likes [Beth]F” has the following structure at LF: 
 (66) John [NEG like [QUE Beth]] 
  
At LF, NEG occupies the same position that only occupies at surface structure while the 
exceptive QUE resides just above the focus associate (in this case, Beth). Like vF&I, we will also 
                                                          
41 vF&I’s semantics can be found in (39) and (40) above. 
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assume that there is a quantifier meaning (i.e. someone/something or anyone/anything) bundled 
into the meaning of the QUE-phrase42 (recall how in (39) and (40) we demonstrated how the QUE-
phrase semantically introduces an existential quantifier that scopes over alternatives). This results 
in (66) having the interpretation “John doesn’t like anyone other than Beth.” 
 The proposed lexical entry for QUE is as follows: 
 
 (67) ⟦QUED⟧w(x)(P) is defined only if (i.e. presupposes that) P(x) = 0 in w.  
If defined, ⟦QUED⟧ w(x)(P) = 1 iff ∀y(y ϵ D & y ≠ x  P(y) = 1 in w)43 
 
   D = the set of alternatives to the focus associate 
 
 ⟦QUED⟧ takes two arguments (x and P). In a world (as designated by the superscript w), 
⟦QUED⟧(x)(P) is defined only if P(x) is false. If defined in that world, ⟦QUED⟧ (x)(P) is true if and 
only if for all y, if y is in the set of alternatives to the focus associate(D) and y is not the same as x, 
then P(y) is true in that world. This entry requires the QUE-phrase to quantifier-raise (QR) to be 
interpretable44. In (36), [QUE Beth] is of type <<e,t>t> (the type of a generalized quantifier). Since 
generalized quantifiers are only interpretable at clausal nodes, it must raise. This results in the 
following structure: 
                                                          
42 vF&I (2007) point out that there is a syntactic discussion to be had concerning whether the existential 
quantifier meaning is inherently bundled into the meaning of the QUE-phrase or whether it’s a covert 
existential quantifier being modified by the QUE-phrase. They elect to follow the former view for simplicity’s 
sake, which I also do here. 
43 The formula in (43) is specific to when the focused element is of type e. If the focused element were of a 
different type (e.g. the focus associate was a verb), the types would be different, but the rest of the formula 





 (68) [[QUED Beth][λx.John [NEG likes x]]] 
This deviates from vF&I, since QUE now scopes above NEG45. In detail, since QUE, is an 
exceptive, it must take a focus associate. In the formula outlined in (67), the focus associate is of 
type e. The QUE-phrase is an existential quantifier that scopes over the alternatives to the focused 
element. These alternatives must also be of type e. This existential quantifier QRs to the top of a 
clause at LF, leaving behind a trace. A demonstration of this structure for the sentence “John only 
likes [Beth]F:” is found below. (A full semantic derivation of (69) can be found in Appendix B.) 
(69) John only likes [Beth]F  
Interpretation: Other than Beth, it is not the case that John likes anyone 
P: John likes Beth. 
A: There is no person who is not Beth that John likes 






  D = the set of alternatives to the focus associate 
                                                          
45 Note that vF&I (2007) would likely disagree with this structure, as it would not aid them in the theoretical 
account of SMCs; however, this structure is still plausible, despite that. 
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Though described in much more detail in Appendix B, we can see that the semantics 
correctly predicts that ⟦John only likes [Beth]F ⟧w is defined only if John likes Beth is true and, if 
defined, John likes no one else in the context besides Beth. When applied to this sentence, our 
formula states that ⟦John only likes [Beth]F⟧w is defined only if John likes Beth is true (the 
presupposition). It also states that if defined, ⟦John only likes [Beth]F⟧w= 1 iff ∀y[y ϵ D & y ≠ b  It 
is not the case that John likes y= 1 in w] (the assertion). By supplying three other individuals for 
the context of the sentence (j for John, m for Mary, and g for George), we create the set of 
alternatives (D). D = {j, m, g}. The formula can then check all the individuals in the context (b, j, m, 
and g) and determine whether each of them is in the set of alternatives (D). If they are, and they are 
not b, then it will determine that it is not the case that John likes them to be true. If they aren’t in the 
set of D and they are b, then it will determine that it is not the case that John likes them to be false. 
With this proposed structure for only, the different focalizations of “John only invited Beth 
to the movie” would provide the accompanying structures and interpretations: 
 
 (70) John only invited [Beth]F to the movie 
   [[QUED Beth][λx.NEG John invited x to the movie]] 
Other than Beth, John did not invite anyone to the movie. 
 
 (71) John only invited Beth to the [movie]F 
   [[QUED the movie][λx.NEG John invited Beth to x]] 
Other than the movie, John didn’t invite Beth to anything. 
  
(72) John only [invited]F Beth to the movie 
[[QUED invited][λx.NEG John x Beth to the movie]] 




 The scalar meaning of only must also be available, so the semantics for QUE need to be 
slightly modified in the same way the old formula for only was modified in Section 2.2: by adding a 
scale.46 
 (73) ⟦QUED⟧w(x)(P) is defined only if (i.e. presupposes that) P(x) = 0 in w.  
If defined, ⟦QUED⟧w(x)(P) = 1 iff ∀y(y ϵ D & y ≰S x  P(y) = 1 in w) 
 
  D = alternatives to the focus associate 
  
To return to the benefits of this formula and proposed structure of only: when the QUE-
phrase scopes above NEG, only is able to license NPIs as well as exhibit a similar pattern of behavior 
as negation when with interacting with modals. As the reader will recall, only scopes over the same 
modals that NEG scopes over. This would follow from accepting a negative split theory of only: if 
only contains NEG, then it makes sense that it would act the same way in its behavior with modals. 
It also provides support for the necessity of negative split accounts of only. 
Before returning in detail to NPI licensing and modal scope interactions with this proposed 
structure and semantics, I will first propose a contrasting structure and semantics for just. With the 
differing structure and semantics of both exceptives laid out, we will then be able to compare them 
side by side in regard to NPI-licensing and their scope relationship with modals. 
   
                                                          
46 The only modification is that y must now not be lower or equal to x on the relevant scale, rather than simply 
not equal to x. This way, scalar interpretations for “John only met [an assistant professor]F at the orientation” 
can be correctly analyzed (e.g. if tested with a student, the semantics would allow for John to have met 
him/her at the orientation, if student is lower than assistant professor in the given context). 
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6.4.3 The structure and semantics for single element ‘just’ 
 
Since just does not interact with modals in the same manner that only does, we have less 
reason to posit that it exhibits a similar NEG + QUE structure. Recall that just consistently scopes 
under the modal in previous example sentences, regardless of what the modal is ((57) is repeated 
here as (74) for the reader’s convenience): 
(74) Exclusive just 
  a. James ought to just eat [bread]F.  modal > just 
  b. James needs to just eat [bread]F.  modal > just 
  c. James should just eat [bread]F.  modal > just 
  d. James may just eat [bread]F.   modal > just 
  e. James can just eat [bread]F.   modal > just 
 
Due to these observations, we propose the following lexical entry for just: 
 
(75) ⟦justC S⟧w is defined only if (i.e. presupposes that) ⟦S⟧w = 1. 
If defined, ⟦justC S⟧w = 1 iff ∀S′(S′ ϵ C) & S ⇏ S′   ⟦S′⟧w = 0 
 
The reader will notice that this is the same lexical entry as for only under a Horn/Rooth 
account. If just is not a case of negative split, then it follows that just does not create a DE 
environment, since unlike only, just does not have a NEG element to create a DE environment. It 
does, however, still create a SDE environment, since given the prejacent of a sentence containing 
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only or just, if α is an element outside of the focus associate and β is in the domain of α, then ƒ(β) is 
presupposed following SDE (ƒ(α)  ƒ(β)). 
The following is a parallel tree structure for “John only likes [Beth]F” in contrast to the tree 
structure for the same sentence in section 1.4.2. (A full derivation of (76) can be found in Appendix 
C.) 
 
(76) John just likes [Beth]F  
Interpretation: The only person that John likes is Beth. 




C = Set of alternatives to the presupposition 
 
The semantics correctly predicts that ⟦John just likes [Beth]F⟧w is defined only if ⟦John likes 







6.4.4 Split ‘only,’ non-split ‘just,’ and NPI licensing 
 
There is one important difference between my proposed semantics for just and only: there 
is no negation in the structure of just. This lack of negation is the key to the divergence of the two 
exclusives regarding NPI-licensing and scope relations when interacting with modals. 
As demonstrated in Section 6.2, both only and just are SDE. This is problematic if one follows a 
theory of a SDE environment licensing NPIs (as proposed by von Fintel 1999), since it incorrectly 
predicts that just will license NPIs. The new structures and semantics for only and just proposed in 
the previous sections will still make incorrect predictions of NPI-licensing under a SDE 
environment theory; however, if we revert back to a plain DE environment for licensing NPIs, the 
grammaticality of sentences containing NPIs and only or just are correctly predicted. The negation 
component of the NEG-split only creates a simple DE environment: 
(77) John only knows that [Jerome]F visited any of our friends in Sweden. (i.e. he 
doesn’t know that Mary visited them, too.) 
 
Structure: [ [QUED Jerome][λx.NEG John knows x visited any of our friends in 
Sweden]] 
 
Check for DE environment: Other than Jerome, it is not the case that John 
knows that anyone visited our friends in Sweden  Other than Jerome, it is 





(78) * John just knows that [Jerome]F visited any of our friends in Sweden. (i.e. he 
doesn’t know that Mary visited them, too.) 
* Isabel just [texts]F any friends on weekends. (i.e. she doesn’t do anything 
more than text them, such as call them or visit them) 
 
Structure: [justC [John knows that JeromeF visited any of our friends in 
Sweden]] 
 
Check for DE environment: John just knows that JeromeF visited our friends 
in Sweden ⇏ John just knows that JeromeF visited our friends in Stockholm 
 
 
 (77) and (78) show that if a simple DE environment is taken to be the condition for NPI-
licensing (i.e. not SDE), the proposed structures and semantics in Sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3 correctly 
predict that NPIs can be licensed by only, but not by just. They also demonstrate why only can only 
license NPIs outside of the focused phrase: if the entire QUE-phrase (which contains the focus 
associate) is raised above negation, it is not in a DE environment, thus an NPI cannot be licensed 
within it. 
 While simple DE environments were originally considered the condition for NPI-licensing 
(Ladusaw, 1979), the observations of only co-occurring with NPIs have made von Fintel’s (1999) 
theory of SDE environments licensing NPIs a long-standing theory as well. Ideally, one would want 
to have additional motivation for abandoning an NPI-licensing theory based on SDE environments 
outside of the current observations regarding these two exceptives. 
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 There are, in fact, other reasons that a simple DE environment may be more desirable to a 
SDE environment as the condition for NPI-licensing. Homer (2008) points out several incorrect 
predictions that an NPI-licensing theory based on SDE makes, such as predicting an NPI to be 
licensed in the scope of the singular definite article (the)47 or incorrectly predicting grammaticality 
of certain sentences containing negation, also, and NPIs48. 
 As cases such as these demonstrate, while SDE is one possibility for accounting for only 
licensing NPIs, in some areas (e.g. some sentences containing the definite article and also) the SDE 
condition overgenerates. This type of evidence may motivate a theory that returns to a simple DE 
environment for NPI licensing. With our proposed theory of the differing structure and semantics of 
just and only, we posit such a return to simple DE. 
                                                          
47 (i) Context: There is exactly one Russian student 
* The Russian student texts any friends on weekends.  
a. β  α: Saturdays  weekends (Saturdays, β, is a subset of weekends, α) 
  b. ƒ(β) is defined:  A Russian student texts friends on Saturdays 
  c. ƒ(α): A Russian student texts friends on weekends 
  ∴ The Russian student texts friends on Saturdays (ƒ(α)  ƒ(β)) 
This problem can potentially be remedied by following Lahiri (1998) and discounting functions that are both 
SDE and SUE at the same time as possible NPI licensers (such as the); however, that won’t save the issue 
raised in the next footnote. 
48 (i) Context: Mary read some interesting book. 
 * I don’t think [John]F also read anything interesting. 
 (LF: not > also > any) 
a. β  α: novels  books (novels, β, are in the domain of books, α) 
  b. ƒ(β) is defined:  John read interesting books, too 
  c. ƒ(α): John read interesting books, too 
  ∴ I don’t think John also read interesting novels (ƒ(α)  ƒ(β)) 
This sentence contains negation, which is a SDE, non-SUE operator. According to a theory that utilizes SDE as 
a condition for NPI-licensing, the sentence should be able to contain an NPI within the scope of the SDE 
operator. As it turns out, an NPI is ungrammatical in this sentence. When this sentence is instead evaluated 
under a plain DE environment licensing condition, however, it is revealed that there is no potential for an NPI 
in the embedded clause: “I don’t think John also read interesting books” ⇏ “I don’t think John also read 
interesting novels.”  
 
Homer (2008) points out that it doesn’t appear to be the scope relationship of NEG > also> NPI that doesn’t 
allow for NPIs to be licensed, as evidenced in the following sentence: 
 (i) Context: Many students in Mary’s class read a very interesting book. 
I don’t think [anybody in John’s class]F also read something interesting.  





6.4.5 Split ‘only,’ non-split ‘just’ and modal scope relationships 
 
 Similarly to NPI-licensing, the negative component to only is the key to why only behaves 
similarly to negation when interacting with modals. If we theorize that it contains negation, then we 
have a reasonable explanation as to why it mirrors negation in regard to its scopal behavior. Below 
we return to the examples in (55) – (57), this time with the new proposed structures included: 
 
(79) Negation (not) 
  a.  James ought to not eat bread.    modal > negation 
[ought to1 [NEG [James t1 eat bread]]]] 
b.  James needs to not eat bread.    modal > negation 
   [[needs to]1 [NEG[James t1 eat bread]] 
  c.  James should not eat bread.    modal > negation 
   [should1 [NEG [James t1 eat bread]]]] 
  d.  James may not eat bread.    negation > modal49 
   [NEG [James may eat bread]] 
  e.  James can not eat bread.    negation > modal 
   [NEG [James can eat bread]] 
   
 
                                                          
49 Note that while the structure for (79d), (79e), (80d), and (80e) are presented here as NEG/only > modal, 
the literature has well documented that with these modals, NEG > modal can also produce a modal > NEG 
interpretation. Why this is the case and exactly how this happens is unclear, but many researchers suspect 
something along the lines of modal raising to produce this second structure (see Cormack & Smith 2002, 
Iatridou & Zeijlstra 2013, and Homer 2015 among others). 
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(80) Exclusive only 
a.  James ought to only eat [bread]F.   modal > only 
[[ought to1][[QUE bread][λx.NEG James t1 eat x]]] 
b.  James needs to only eat [bread]F.   modal> only 
[[needs to1][QUE bread][λx.NEG [James t1 eat x]]] 
  c.  James should only eat [bread]F.   modal > only 
[should1 [[QUE bread][λx.NEG James t1 eat x]]] 
  d.  James may only eat [bread]F.    only > modal 
[[QUE bread][λx.NEG [James should eat x]]] 
  e.  James can only eat [bread]F.    only > modal 
[[QUE bread][λx.NEG [James can eat x]]] 
 
(81) Exclusive just 
  a.  James ought to just eat [bread]F.   modal > just 
[[ought to]1 [just [James t1 eat [bread]F]]] 
b.  James needs to just eat [bread]F.   modal > just 
[[needs to]1 [just [James t1 eat [bread]F]]] 
  c.  James should just eat [bread]F.    modal > just 
[[should]1 [just [James t1 eat [bread]F]]] 
  d.  James may just eat [bread]F.    modal > just 
   [[may]1 [just [James t1 eat [bread]F]]] 
  e. James can just eat [bread]F.    modal > just 
[[can]1 [just [James t1 eat [bread]F]]] 




 As for why negation takes scope over some modals and scope under other modals, that is a 
topic outside of the scope of this manuscript. We once again refer the reader to Cormack & Smith 
(2002), Iatridou & Zeijlstra (2013), and Homer (2015) for their theories on this matter. The 
proposed split account of only simply follows the same rules as standard negation, since it contains 
negation. It appears that the additional QUE-phrase has no influence on the scope effects. Just, 
however, consistently has the modal scoping over the sentential operator since it does not contain 
negation. 
 
6.5 Issues with the current theory: SMCs 
 
As mentioned before, this theory is simply a first attempt at accounting for the observed NPI 
and modal/scope differences between only and just. While it’s successful in capturing these 
variations, there are other areas where it has substantial drawbacks. The two most prominent 
places both relate to SMCs. In 6.4.2 – 6.4.5, I outlined why it was important to have negation scope 
over QUE in order to accurately predict the observed NPI licensing and modal/scope interaction 
behaviors. Unfortunately, however, there is a clear disadvantage to using this particular scope 
configuration. 
When QUE is moved outside of the scope of negation, we get a different structure for SMCs 
than the one proposed by vF&I. In and of itself, this not an issue; the problem occurs when we look 
at what the new theory predicts for the presuppositions and assertions. To compare, vF&I’s 
structure, presupposition and assertion are below as compared with my structure, presupposition, 
and assertion50: 
 
                                                          
50 Both of the presuppositions use the weak presupposition: ∃x(P(x) = 1. 
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(82) A comparison of presuppositions and assertions for SMCs 
a. vF&I split account: 
To get good cheese you NEG have to QUE [go to the North End]  
P: In all worlds where you get good cheese, you have to do something. 
A: In some of the worlds where you get good cheese, you don’t have to go 
anywhere other than the North End. 
 
  b. My split account: 
 To get good cheese, QUE [go to the North End]1 NEG you have to t1   
P: There is something in all the worlds where you get good cheese such that 
you have to do it. 
A: With the exception of the North End, there is no such place that you go in 
all the worlds where you get good cheese. 
 
 Unsurprisingly, the presuppositions and assertions are both different.  Now that the QUE 
(with its existential modifier component) is scoping over the negation, we end up back at the 
Prejacent Problem, even if we utilize the weaker presupposition. We end up with a particular thing 
which must be done in all the worlds where you get good cheese. This certainly isn’t true, and in 
this circumstance, vF&I’s split only is more accurate. The assertion that we create is different, but 
doesn’t seem incorrect: excepting the North End, there isn’t a particular place that you must go in 
all the worlds where you get good cheese. Since the North End is minimally sufficient, you must 
minimally go there to get good cheese (but you could go somewhere else that is more difficult to get 
to).  
The other issue for the theory in regard to SMCs is that its two sets of different structures 
and semantics fail to account for the observation that just  is able to participate in SMCs: 
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 (83) To get good cheese, you just have to go to the North End! 
 The reason that vF&I (2007) originally proposed the split account of only was to account for 
the Prejacent Problem and if we’re assuming a split structure for only, but a traditional non-split 
structure for just, we have no way of solving this issue for just. SMCs containing just, that are 
completely acceptable and interpretable, will end up having the same incorrect presuppositions (in 
this case: “In all worlds where you get good cheese, you have to go to the North End.”).  
 
6.6 Areas of future research 
 
While there are many potential areas of future research, the most enticing is that of the 
scope/modal interaction relationships. As mentioned in the Methodology chapter, I included two 
exclusive fillers per list to run a preliminary analysis on. I checked for a correlation between these 
sentence ratings and the NPI sentence ratings to see if their judgments patterned similarly. The 
reader will recall that this directly addresses my third experiment prediction (participants who, on 
average, judge the JUST versions of the NPI sentences to be more acceptable will also find the JUST 
versions of the exclusive fillers to be more acceptable). This correlation was done by-participant 
using Pearson’s product-moment correlation, where each individual participant contributed a mean 
rating for their JUST + NPI sentences (4 sentences total) and their mean rating for JUST + modal 
sentences (1 sentence total). The prediction expected a significant positive correlation, but the 
results were actually a non-significant negative correlation (r = -0.154, p = 0.15). 
 While the data and analysis unfortunately do not support Prediction 3, it is not my belief 
that this prediction should be entirely abandoned. As previously mentioned, the exclusive fillers 
were included as the beginning of a pursuit on the complicated scope interactions between just and 
modals. Each participant only saw two of these exclusive fillers (one ONLY version and one JUST 
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version), meaning the sample size was much, much smaller than the experimental sample size for 
NPIs. Also, since these were designated as fillers, no special training on these modal sentences was 
given (outside of how to cope with short story fillers). Between these factors, it’s quite possible that 
the data do not accurately represent the participants’ opinions of JUST + modal sentences. A similar 
experiment to my NPI experiment could be conducted which focuses specifically on these 
modal/scope interactions. The findings could provide support for my theory that only behaves like 
negation (due to their similarities in the environment of modals and NPIs), or could steer the 
theory into a different direction. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 When I first decided to create and administrate an experiment on the relative acceptability 
of just and only in sentences with NPIs, I had two goals: 1) to discover if my intuitions about these 
types of sentences matched the intuitions of average native American English speakers, and 2) to 
determine whether the experimental data supported a theory where just and only had different 
structures and/or semantics. I was able to meet both of these goals.  
 My theory on just and only was based upon intuitive judgments that just was not able to 
license weak NPIs in sentences parallel to those where only could license them. Furthermore, both 
only and just  versions were judged to be completely grammatically acceptable without NPIs. The 
statistics from the NPI experiment support these judgments. When analyzing the data in a 2x2 
model (JUST/ONLY and NPI/no NPI), the mean ratings were as follows: ONLY + no NPI: M =5.16 
SD =1.12, JUST + no NPI: M = 4.82  SD = 1.23, ONLY + NPI: M = 4.04  SD = 1.59 , JUST + NPI: M = 
3.15, SD = 1.68. I found a significant main effect for version (adjusting from JUST to ONLY: p < 
0.001) and a significant main effect for NPI category (adjusting from JUST + no NPI to JUST + NPI: p 
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< 0.001), indicating a high degree of confidence that these predictors (version and NPI category) 
are responsible for the difference in means. The Tukey Test revealed no significant difference 
between JUST + no NPI and ONLY + no NPI, which aligns with the expectation that participants 
would find these sentences more or less equally acceptable. A significant difference between JUST + 
no NPI and JUST + NPI, however, was demonstrated (p < 0.001).  This was also as anticipated 
(falling under the prediction that participants would judge the JUST + NPI sentences to be less 
acceptable than the JUST + no NPI sentences). 
 The data both support my intuitions about the acceptability of exclusive + NPI sentences 
and also strongly endorse a theory where just and only are not treated the same. While they do not 
directly support or refute my proposed theory regarding the structures and semantics of these 
exclusives, they certainly discourage a theory that conflates the two. Only’s ability to license NPIs 
has been challenging to account for in the prior literature (von Fintel 1999) due to its inability to 
create classic DE environments. Utilizing any of the previous explanations for only produces 
incorrect predictions for just if we assume an identical structure and semantics as only. In my 
theory, I posit that 1) just has the same structure and semantics that has classically been assigned 
to only under a Horn/Rooth account, 2) only has a split NEG + EXC structure, and 3) NPI licensing 
is determined by DE (rather than SDE) environments. This is certainly not the only approach and, 
indeed, this theory has its own issues. The important thing moving forward is that any semantic 
account for only and just must be able to account for these acceptability differences, which are now 
backed up by experimental data. 
 There is still much work to be done in regard to only and just. Modal/scope interaction 
sentences were only lightly touched upon in the experiment as filler items, and the preliminary 
statistics did not show a strong correlation between NPI acceptability and modal/scope 
interpretation acceptability for the sentences including just. Since the data set was so small, it is 
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unclear whether my own intuitions do not match the intuitions of a larger population (perhaps 
meaning that the modal/scope interaction and NPI licensing observations are unrelated) or if these 
particular sentences were suboptimal in some way. Either way, a similar experiment on the 
acceptability of modal/scope interpretations of sentences with negation, only, and just could prove 
as enlightening as this experiment. On a broader view, there are still many perplexing behaviors of 
just that are waiting to be explored, such as its unacceptability in phrase-initial/sentence-initial 
positions for many English speakers51 and its ability to equally participate in SMCs. It is my hope 
that my findings outlined in this manuscript will contribute to a growing discussion on just and how 











                                                          
51 Except in Minimal Sufficiency Readings (Grotz 2012, Coppock and Beaver 2014, Coppock and Lindahl 
2014), which seem to be acceptable to everyone: 




Appendix A: Alternative Semantics applied to “John only invited [Beth]F to the movie” 
Application of the formula in (15) to “John only invited [Beth]F to the movie,”  
 
(15) ⟦onlyC S⟧w is defined only if (i.e. presupposes that) ⟦S⟧w = 1. 
If defined, ⟦onlyC S⟧w = 1 iff ∀S′(S′ ϵ C) & S ⇏ S′   ⟦S′⟧w = 052 
 
 
Sentence of the structure only + S: “John only invited [Beth]F to the movie” 
 
Individuals in the domain: John, Beth, Eli, Daryl, Lily 
 
 S = “John invited [Beth]F to the movie” 
 
C = {"
"John invited Eli to the movie"
John invited Daryl to the movie"
"John invited Lily to the movie"
} 
 
Formula for only + S: 
⟦onlyC S⟧w is defined only if (i.e. presupposes that) ⟦S⟧w = 1. 
If defined, ⟦onlyC S⟧w = 1 iff ∀S′(S′ ϵ C) & S ⇏ S′   ⟦S′⟧w = 0 
 
Application of formula to the only + S sentence: 
                                                          
52 The assertion could also be written as the following: 
(i) If defined, ⟦onlyC S⟧w = 1 iff ¬∃S′ [(S′ ϵ C) & S ⇏ S′ & ⟦S′⟧w = 0] 






⟦John only invited [Beth]F to the movie⟧w is defined only if (i.e. presupposes 




If defined, ⟦John only invited [Beth]F to the movie⟧w = 1 iff 
∀S′(S′ ϵ {"
"John invited Eli to the movie"
John invited Daryl to the movie"
"John invited Lily to the movie"
}  
 
& “John invited Beth to the movie” ⇏ S′   ⟦S′⟧w = 0 
 
 Test for all S′: 
 
1. S′ = “John invited Eli to the movie:” 
 
 S′ ϵ {"
"John invited Eli to the movie"
John invited Daryl to the movie"
"John invited Lily to the movie"
} = 1 
 S ⇏ S′ = 1 
 ∴ ⟦John invited Eli to the movie⟧w = 0 
 




 S′ ϵ {"
"John invited Eli to the movie"
John invited Daryl to the movie"
"John invited Lily to the movie"
} = 1 
 S ⇏ S′ = 1 
 ∴ ⟦John invited Daryl to the movie⟧w = 0 
 
3. S′ = “John invited Lily to the movie:” 
 
 S′ ϵ {"
"John invited Eli to the movie"
John invited Daryl to the movie"
"John invited Lily to the movie"
} = 1 
 S ⇏ S′ = 1 
 ∴ ⟦John invited Lily to the movie⟧w = 0 
 
4. S′ = “John invited Beth to the movie:” 
 
 S′ ϵ {"
"John invited Eli to the movie"
John invited Daryl to the movie"
"John invited Lily to the movie"
} = 0 
 S ⇏ S′ = 0 
 ∴ It is not the case that ⟦John invited Beth to the movie⟧w = 0 
 
To return to the claim that negating a sentence containing only also negates the assertion, 
but not the presupposition, below we negate the previous example: 
 
(28) “John didn’t only invite [Beth]F to the movie” 




"John invited Eli to the movie"
John invited Daryl to the movie"
"John invited Lily to the movie"
} 
 
¬⟦onlyC S⟧w is defined only if (i.e. presupposes that) ⟦S⟧w = 1. 
If defined, ¬⟦onlyC S⟧w = 1 iff ¬∀S′(S′ ϵ C) & S ⇏ S′   ⟦S′⟧w = 0 
 
  P: John invited Beth to the movie 
A: ¬∀S (S ϵ C & S ⇏ S′   ⟦S′⟧w = 0 
 
 For (28) to be true, not only must the presupposition “John invited Beth to the movie” be 
true, but there must be a sentence in the set of C that is also true. Meaning that ⟦John invited Beth to 
the movie⟧w must be true, and at least one of ⟦John invited Eli to the movie⟧w, ⟦John invited Daryl to 















Appendix B: Semantic derivation ONLY + [Beth]F 
Derivation of (69): 
 
⟦QUED⟧w(x)(P) is defined only if (i.e. presupposes that) P(x) = 0 in w.  
If defined, ⟦QUED⟧w(x)(P) = 1 iff ∀y(y ϵ D & y ≠ x  P(y) = 1 in w) 
D = Set of alternatives to the focus associate 
  j = ⟦John⟧  
b = ⟦Beth⟧ 
 
 Step 1: functional application and lambda conversion 
⟦1⟧  = ⟦2⟧(⟦3⟧)       
= ⟦4⟧(⟦Beth⟧)(⟦3⟧) 
= ⟦QUE D⟧w(b) (⟦3⟧) 
⟦QUE D⟧w(b) (⟦3⟧) is defined only if (i.e. presupposes that) ⟦3⟧(x) = 0 in w.  
If defined, ⟦QUED⟧w(b)( ⟦3⟧) = 1 iff ∀y(y ϵ D & y ≠ b  ⟦3⟧(y) = 1 in w) 
 
 
Step 2: Define the presupposition  
⟦John only likes [Beth]F ⟧ is defined only if  ⟦3⟧(b) = 0 in w. 
⟦3⟧(b) = [λx.⟦5⟧](b) 
  =[λx. ¬⟦6⟧](b) 
  =[λx. ¬ j likes x](b) 
  = It is not the case that j likes b in w. 
 
⟦John only likes [Beth]F ⟧ is defined only if it is not the case that j likes b = 0 in w 
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⟦John only likes [Beth]F ⟧ is defined only if  j likes b = 1 in w 
 
  
Step 3: Define the assertion 
If defined, ⟦John only likes [Beth]F ⟧w = 1 iff  ∀y [y ϵ D & b ≠ x  ⟦3⟧ (y) = 1 in w] 
∀y [y ϵ D & y ≠ b  ⟦3⟧ (y) = 1 in w] 
∀y [y ϵ D & y ≠ b  [λx. ¬⟦6⟧(y) = 1 in w] 
∀y [y ϵ D & y ≠ b  [ [λx. ¬ j likes x](y) = 1 in w] 
∀y [y ϵ D & y ≠ b  It is not the case that j likes y= 1 in w 
 
 
Breakdown with Individuals: 
 
Set of individuals in the domain = {John, Mary, Beth, George} or {j, m, b, g} 
 Focus associate = Beth, or b 
 D = {John, Mary, George} or {j, m, g} 
 
 
⟦John only likes [Beth]F ⟧w is defined only if John likes Beth is true (Presupposition) 
If defined, ⟦John only likes [Beth]F ⟧w= 1 iff ∀y[y ϵ D & y ≠ b  It is not the case that John 
likes y= 1 in w] (Assertion) 
 
∀y [y ϵ D & y ≠ b  It is not the case that j likes y= 1 in w] 




y1 = j 
 y ϵ {j, m, g} = 1 
 y ≠ b = 1 
 ∴ It is not the case that j likes j = 1 in w 
y2 = m 
 y ϵ {j, m, g} = 1 
 y ≠ b = 1 
 ∴ It is not the case that j likes m = 1 in w 
y3: = g 
 y ϵ {j, m, g} = 1 
 y ≠ b = 1 
 ∴ It is not the case that j likes g = 1 in w 
y4 = b 
 y ϵ {j, m, g} = 0 
 y ≠ b = 0 
 ∴ It is not the case that j likes b = 0 in w 
 
The semantics correctly predicts that ⟦John only likes [Beth]F ⟧w is defined only if John likes 









Appendix C: Semantic derivation of JUST + [Beth]F 
Derivation of (76): 
⟦justC S⟧w is defined only if (i.e. presupposes that) ⟦S⟧w = 1. 
If defined, ⟦justC S⟧w = 1 iff ∀S′(S′ ϵ C) & S ⇏ S′   ⟦S′⟧w = 0 
 
 C = Set of alternatives to the prejacent 
 S = the prejacent 
 
Step 1: functional application and lambda conversion 
⟦1⟧ = ⟦2⟧(⟦3⟧) 
 = ⟦just C⟧w(⟦3⟧w) 
= ⟦just C⟧w(⟦3⟧w)is defined only if (i.e. presupposes that) ⟦3⟧w = 1. 
If defined, ⟦just C⟧w(⟦3⟧w) = 1 iff ∀S′(S′ ϵ C) & S ⇏ S′   ⟦S′⟧w = 0 
 
 Step 2: Define the presupposition: 
⟦John just likes [Beth]F⟧w is defined only if (i.e. presupposes that) ⟦3⟧w = 1 
⟦3⟧w = ⟦John likes Beth⟧w 
⟦John just likes [Beth]F⟧w is defined only if (i.e. presupposes that) ⟦John likes Beth⟧w = 1 
 
Step 3: Define the assertion: 
 
If defined, ⟦John just likes [Beth]F⟧w = 1 iff ∀S′(S′ ϵ C) & (“John likes Beth” ≰S S′)  ⟦S′⟧w = 0 
  ∀S′ [(S ϵ C) & (“John likes Beth” ≰S S′  ⟦S′⟧w = 0 





(75) Breakdown with Individuals: 
 
Set of individuals in the domain = {John, Mary, Beth, George} or {j, m, b, g} 
  Focus associate = b 
  S = “John likes Beth” 
 






⟦John just likes [Beth]F⟧ is defined only in worlds where j likes b = 1 (Presupposition) 
If defined in a world w, ⟦John just likes [Beth]F⟧ = 1 iff  ∀S[(S ϵ C) & (“John likes Beth” ≰S S) 
 ⟦S⟧w =0] (Assertion) 
 
1. S′ = “John likes John” 




} = 1 
 “John likes Beth” ≰S S′ = 1 
 ∴ ⟦John likes John⟧w = 0 
2. S′ = “John likes Mary” 




} = 1 
 “John likes Beth” ≰S S′ = 1 
 ∴ ⟦John likes Mary⟧w = 0 
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3. S′ = “John likes George” 




} = 1  
“John likes Beth”≰S S′ = 1  
∴ ⟦John likes George⟧w = 0  
4. S′ = “John likes Beth” 




} = 0 
 “John likes Beth”≰S S′ = 0 
 ∴ ⟦John likes Beth⟧w = 1 
 
The semantics correctly predicts that ⟦John just likes [Beth]F⟧w is defined only if ⟦John likes 















Appendix D: Experimental sentences used in pilot 
 
1A Jonathan doesn't drink BEER at his parties; he drinks WINE      
1B Jonathan doesn't drink BEER at any of his parties; he drinks WINE.    
1C Jonathan only drinks BEER at any of his parties; he doesn't drink WINE.    
1D Jonathan just drinks BEER at any of his parties; he doesn't drink WINE. 
         
2A Mary doesn’t TEXT her friends on weekends; she CALLS them instead.     
2B Mary doesn’t ever TEXT her friends on weekends; she CALLS them instead.    
2C Mary only ever TEXTS her friends on the weekends; she doesn’t CALL them. 
2D Mary just ever TEXTS her friends on the weekends; she doesn’t CALL them. 
         
3A That restaurant doesn’t serve SOUP with its entrees; it serves SALAD.    
3B That restaurant doesn’t serve SOUP with any of its entrees; it serves SALAD.   
3C That restaurant only serves SOUP with any of its entrees; it doesn’t serve SALAD.   
3D That restaurant just serves SOUP with any of its entrees; it doesn’t serve SALAD. 
         
4A Catherine won't WRITE the children’s book; she'll ILLUSTRATE it.    
4B Catherine won't ever WRITE the children’s book; she'll ILLUSTRATE it.    
4C Catherine will only ever WRITE the children’s book; she won’t ILLUSTRATE it.   
4D Catherine will just ever WRITE the children’s book; she won’t ILLUSTRATE it. 
         
5A Henry will not play soccer in MARCH this year; he will play in JUNE.    
5B Henry will not play any soccer in MARCH this year; he will play in JUNE.    
5C Henry will only play any soccer in MARCH this year; he won't play in JUNE.   
5D Henry will just play any soccer in MARCH this year; he won't play in JUNE. 
          
6A My sister’s husband doesn't WALK on his treadmill; he always RUNS on it.   
6B My sister’s husband doesn't ever WALK on his treadmill; he always RUNS on it. 
6C My sister’s husband only ever WALKS on his treadmill; he doesn't RUN on it.   
6D My sister’s husband just ever WALKS on his treadmill; he doesn't RUN on it. 
          
7A Nina doesn’t take classes at the UNIVERSITY; she goes to the COMMUNITY COLLEGE.   
7B Nina doesn’t take any classes at the UNIVERSITY; she goes to the  COMMUNITY COLLEGE.  
7C Nina only takes any classes at the UNIVERSITY; she doesn’t go to the  COMMUNITY COLLEGE.  
7D Nina just takes any classes at the UNIVERSITY; she doesn’t go to the  COMMUNITY COLLEGE. 
         
8A Jacob’s cat doesn’t SCRATCH strangers that try to pet her; she BITES them.    
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8B Jacob’s cat doesn’t ever SCRATCH strangers that try to pet her; she BITES them.    
8C Jacob’s cat only ever SCRATCHES strangers that try to pet her; she doesn’t BITE them.   
8D Jacob’s cat just ever SCRATCHES strangers that try to pet her; she doesn’t BITE them. 
         
9A Morgan doesn’t borrow clothes from SARAH; she borrows clothes from HELEN.    
9B Morgan doesn’t borrow any clothes from SARAH; she borrows clothes from HELEN.   
9C Morgan only borrows any clothes from SARAH; she doesn’t borrow clothes from HELEN.   
9D Morgan just borrows any clothes from SARAH; she doesn’t borrow clothes from HELEN.  
   
10A Scott doesn’t DOZE on the red-eye flights he books; he SLEEPS on them.    
10B Scott doesn’t ever DOZE on the red-eye flights he books; he SLEEPS on them.    
10C Scott only ever DOZES on the red-eye flights he books; he doesn’t SLEEP on them.   
10D Scott just ever DOZES on the red-eye flights he books; he doesn’t SLEEP on them. 
         
11A Ella doesn’t eat PANCAKES for her weekend breakfasts; she eats WAFFLES.    
11B Ella doesn’t eat PANCAKES for any of her weekend breakfasts; she eats WAFFLES.   
11C Ella only eats PANCAKES for any of her weekend breakfasts; she doesn’t eat WAFFLES.   
11D Ella just eats PANCAKES for any of her weekend breakfasts; she doesn’t eat WAFFLES. 
         
12A Sophia doesn’t STEAM the frozen dumplings she buys; she FRIES them.     
12B Sophia doesn’t ever STEAM the frozen dumplings she buys; she FRIES them.    
12C Sophia only ever STEAMS the frozen dumplings she buys; she doesn’t FRY them.   



















Appendix E: Final experiment fillers 
 
21 filler pairs: (7/7/7) 
7 modifier (“last”/”next”) on NP 
7 modifier on VP (adverbs) 
7 Contrastive sentences (no negation) 
(Pair total: 42 fillers) 
 
12 Modal/Short Story sentences (including 3 JUST/ONLY Experimental Crossover) 
(Short Story total: 12 fillers) 
Total: 54 filler sentences 
  
npMod: Modifier on an NP (last/next) - 7 
F1 (FIL-npMod-LAST) 
F1A  * Josephine admires that OWEN took his dog on vacation with him summer; she doesn’t 
admire that DEREK also took his. 
F1B   Josephine admires that OWEN took his dog on vacation with him last summer; she doesn’t 
admire that DEREK also took his. 
 
F2 (FIL-npMod-LAST) 
F2A  The tech representative tells me that JULIA worked night shifts this week; he didn’t tell me 
that HARVEY did, too. 
F2B   The tech representative tells me that JULIA worked night shifts this last week; he didn’t tell 
me that HARVEY did, too. 
 
F3 (FIL-npMod-LAST) 
F3A  The teacher notices that ALFRED brought his tablet on the school trip; she doesn’t notice 
that JARED did, too. 
F3B   The teacher notices that ALFRED brought his tablet on the last school trip; she doesn’t 
notice that JARED did, too. 
 
F4 (FIL-npMod-LAST) 
F4A  Milly is sad that the ELECTRIC BILL was lost in the mail on Tuesday; she isn’t sad that the 
WATER BILL was lost. 
F4B   * Milly is sad that the ELECTRIC BILL was lost in the mail on last Tuesday; she isn’t sad that 





F5A  Natalie senses that her BROTHER will make milkshakes for the picnic; she doesn’t sense 
that her SISTER will. 
F5B   Natalie senses that her BROTHER will make milkshakes for the next picnic; she doesn’t 
sense that her SISTER will. 
 
F6 (FIL-npMod-NEXT) 
F6A  Tim likes that the POPCORN will be served fresh at the movie showing; he doesn’t like that 
the NACHOS will be served fresh, too. 
F6B   Tim likes that the POPCORN will be served fresh at the next movie showing; he doesn’t like 
that the NACHOS will be served fresh, too. 
 
F7 (FIL-npMod-NEXT) 
F7A  Penelope is certain that my AUNT has a recital in March; she’s not certain that my COUSIN 
has one. 
F7B   * Penelope is certain that my AUNT has a recital in last March; she’s not certain that my 
COUSIN has one.  
 
vpMod: Modifier on a VP (adverbs) – 7 
F8 (FIL-vpMod) 
F8A  The vice principal remarks that KENNETH gets high marks on his exams; she doesn’t 
remark that JESSE does, too. 
F8B   ? The vice principal remarks that KENNETH gets quickly high marks on his exams; she 
doesn’t remark that JESSE does, too. 
 
F9 (FIL-vpMod) 
F9A  My father demonstrates that ROBINS visit his birdhouse; he doesn’t demonstrate that 
HUMMINGBIRDS also visit it. 
F9B   My father demonstrates that ROBINS regularly visit his birdhouse; he doesn’t demonstrate 
that HUMMINGBIRDS also visit it. 
 
F10 (FIL-vpMod) 
F10A   Louisa forgets that TIMOTHY will sing in the play; she doesn’t forget that LAWRENCE will 
sing in it, too. 
F10B * Louisa forgets that TIMOTHY will sing in the play yesterday; she doesn’t forget that 
LAWRENCE will sing in it, too. 
 
F11 (FIL-vpMod) 
F11A   The child is upset that ALPHONSE sipped her apple juice; she isn’t upset that WALLACE did. 




F12A   Carver concludes that his ASSISTANT plays tennis at the country club; he doesn’t conclude 
that his SECRETARY does. 
F12B Carver concludes that his ASSISTANT frequently plays tennis at the country club; he doesn’t 





F13A   Jen reads that BEARS catch fish at the river outside of town; she doesn’t read that OTTERS 
do, too. 
F13B Jen reads that BEARS patiently catch fish at the river outside of town; she doesn’t read that 
OTTERS do, too. 
 
F14 (FIL-vpMod) 
F14A   Darcy is surprised that her FATHER loved to build model airplanes; she isn’t surprised that 
her MOTHER did. 
F14B * Darcy is surprised that her FATHER loved to build model airplanes tomorrow; she isn’t 
surprised that her MOTHER did. 
 
 
Contr: CONTRASTIVE (with degrees) - 7 
F15 (FIL-ContrReally) 
F15A   My piano teacher informs me that SPINACH is the healthiest food; my physical therapist 
informs me that CARROTS are. 
F15B My piano teacher informs me that SPINACH is really the healthiest food; my physical 
therapist informs me that CARROTS are. 
 
F16 (FIL-ContrKindOf) 
F16A   Linda complains that her MOTHER-IN-LAW listens to country music; Jimmy complains that 
his FATHER does. 
F16B Linda complains that her MOTHER-IN-LAW kind of listens to country music; Jimmy 
complains that his FATHER does. 
 
F17 (FIL-ContrALittle) 
F17A   Bill confides that GEORGIA’S parents hated her kindergarten teacher; Kyle confides that 
TABITHA’S parents did. 
F17B * Bill confides that GEORGIA’S parents a little hated her kindergarten teacher; Kyle confides 
that TABITHA’S parents did. 
 
F18 (FIL-ContrReally) 
F18A   Timothy assumes that JOSEPH wanted to buy popsicles for dessert; Anthony assumes that 
SERENA wanted to buy them herself. 
F18B Timothy assumes that JOSEPH really wanted to buy popsicles for dessert; Anthony assumes 
that SERENA wanted to buy them herself. 
 
F19 (FIL-ContrKindOf) 
F19A   My best friend writes that her COWORKER annoys her at her job; my brother writes that his 
SUPERVISOR does. 
F19B My best friend writes that her COWORKER kind of annoys her at her job; my brother writes 
that his SUPERVISOR does. 
  
F20 (FIL-ContrALittle) 
F20A   David tells me that GEOLOGY is difficult to teach kids at summer camp; Leigh tells me that 
PAINTING is, instead. 
F20B David tells me that GEOLOGY is a little difficult to teach kids at summer camp; Leigh tells me 





F21A   Gilbert brags that his GRANDMOTHER excels at cribbage; Felicity brags that her HUSBAND 
does. 











FIL22 (13: may_Pizza) 
Situation: Nick is a 10-year-old kid who aced his math exam in school today. His mother will order 
him a pizza tonight to celebrate. Nick asks if they can also order some breadsticks, but his mother 
thinks this is too much unhealthy food.  
 
Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 
(Note: participants will only see one of the following two options, dependent on list) 
13-ONLY Nick may only eat PIZZA for dinner tonight; he may not have BREADSTICKS as well. 
13-JUST Nick may just eat PIZZA for dinner tonight; he may not have BREADSTICKS as well. 
 
FIL23 (14: may_Van) 
Situation: James is a teenager who recently got his driver’s license. He doesn’t have his own car, but 
his family owns three vehicles: a van, a sports car, and a truck. Since James is a new driver, his 
parents stipulate that he is limited to driving the van when he drives around town alone.  
 
Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 
 (Note: participants will only see one of the following two options, dependent on list) 
14-ONLY James may only drive the VAN without his parents; he may not drive the SPORTS 
CAR. 
14-JUST James may just drive the VAN without his parents; he may not drive the SPORTS 
CAR. 
 
FIL24 (15: may_Honors) 
Situation: Belinda is a student in the honors program at her high school. To ensure fair treatment of 
all the honors students, since honors courses are in high demand, the school enforces a limit of one 
honors course per student each semester. Belinda chooses Honors History as her one honors 
course. 
 
Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 
(Note: participants will only see one of the following two options, dependent on list) 
15-ONLY Belinda may only take honors HISTORY this semester; she may not take honors 
PHYSICS. 





F25 (FIL-MODAL_MUSTgarden) # 
Situation: Terrance works at a Bed and Breakfast where he does various tasks to maintain the 
house and grounds. His employer gives him a list of things that must be done this week, which 
includes weeding the garden, cleaning the windows, and vacuuming the rooms. Today is sunny, but 
the rest of the days this week will be rainy, so his employer tells him it’s important that the 
gardening be done today. 
 
Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 
#Terrance must clean INSIDE today; he doesn’t have to work OUTSIDE. 
 
F26 (FIL-MODAL_MUSTexams) 
Situation: A middle school teacher recently gave final exams for her students. She has two deadlines 
that she must meet before wrapping up her semester. The first deadline is completing her grading 
by tomorrow. The second deadline is submitting her grades to her principal by next week. 
 
Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 
The teacher must grade the final exams by TOMORROW; she doesn’t have to submit grades until 




Situation: Clark is training the family dog Martha using positive reinforcement in the form of treats. 
When he gives a command, he gives the dog a treat if she obeys him immediately. Clark’s two kids 
are not participating in the training, and they give her treats even when she doesn’t obey a 
command. 
 
Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 





Situation: Madeline is organizing a party for her daughter’s birthday today. Since she is very busy, 
she made a list of all the things she needed to do, and did one thing a day from the list. 
Unfortunately, she did not take into account the preparation time of the birthday cake at the local 
bakery. She picked up the ice cream from the store yesterday and ordered the cake from the bakery 
today, but the baker tells her that the cake won’t be ready until tomorrow. 
 
Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 





Situation: The vending machine at Larry’s work is constantly malfunctioning. Several employees 
have gotten frustrated with it and have resorted to hitting it to get their purchases. The office has 
cautioned its workers to not do anything more than gently tap the machine. Today, Larry used the 
vending machine and his bag of chips got stuck. 
 
Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 
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F30 (FIL-MODAL_SHOULDgirlscout) # 
Situation: Bill brought his daughter to work today because she’s a Girl Scout who’s trying to sell 
boxes of cookies. He doesn’t think that his coworkers at the office will want to buy any boxes, so he 
emphasizes that she should be extremely persistent. 
 
Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 
#The Girl Scout should ask the office workers if they want to buy cookies ONE time; she doesn’t 




Situation: William likes to go to the library to study and he likes to listen to music while he’s 
studying. The library he visits allows this, but under the condition that all visitors use headphones if 
they’re going to listen to anything. 
 
Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 





Situation: Hubert is an assistant for a successful lawyer at the local law firm. An important client of 
the lawyer’s wants a meeting today, but Hubert tells her that the lawyer’s schedule is completely 
booked. He offers to schedule the meeting for tomorrow instead. 
Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 




Situation: Lewis dropped some clothes off at the dry cleaners yesterday. When he was asked 
whether he could come and pick them up the next day, he told them that he was too busy, but could 
pick them up the day after. 
 
Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 
# Lewis can pick up the clothes from the dry cleaners TODAY; he can’t do it TOMORROW. 
 
F34 (FIL-MODAL_CAN) 
Situation: Howard has wanted to vacation in Jamaica for the past three years. He’s been saving up 
money from his job and has finally collected enough to visit in the coming spring. He won’t be able 
to go this coming winter due to his busy work schedule.  
 
Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 






Appendix F: Experimental sentences for experiment 
 Each participant sees 24 experimental items (4 pairs for only, 4 pairs for just, and 4 pairs 
for negation 
 Part A: Sentence without NPI 
 Part B: Sentence with NPI 
12 Experimental Sentences with 3 versions each 
Key differences: added an embedded clause, the focused element has stress on the last syllable, 
strived to use a small, high-frequency, non-contrastive verb in main clause 
 
1: any_Parties  
1A-NEG  Wendy doesn’t think that BERNARD ruins her parties; she thinks that KATHY ruins 
them. 
1A-ONLY  Wendy only thinks that BERNARD ruins her parties; she doesn’t think that KATHY 
ruins them. 
1A-JUST  Wendy just thinks that BERNARD ruins her parties; she doesn’t think that KATHY 
ruins them. 
1B-NEG  Wendy doesn’t think that BERNARD ruins any of her parties; she thinks that KATHY 
ruins them. 
1B-ONLY  Wendy only thinks that BERNARD ruins any of her parties; she doesn’t think that 
KATHY ruins them. 
1B-JUST Wendy just thinks that BERNARD ruins any of her parties; she doesn’t think that 
KATHY ruins them. 
 
2: ever_SwedishFriends 
2A-NEG John doesn’t know that JEROME visited our friends in Sweden; he knows that MARY 
visited them. 
2A-ONLY  John only knows that JEROME visited our friends in Sweden; he doesn’t know that 
MARY visited them. 
2A-JUST  John just knows that JEROME visited our friends in Sweden; he doesn’t know that 
MARY visited them. 
2B-NEG John doesn’t know that JEROME ever visited our friends in Sweden; he knows that 
MARY visited them. 
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2B-ONLY  John only knows that JEROME ever visited our friends in Sweden; he doesn’t know 
that MARY visited them. 
2B-JUST  John just knows that JEROME ever visited our friends in Sweden; he doesn’t know 
that MARY visited them. 
3: any_Soup 
3A-NEG Andrew doesn’t believe that SUZANNE ordered soup at lunch; he believes that GREG 
did. 
3A-ONLY  Andrew only believes that SUZANNE ordered soup at lunch; he doesn’t believe that 
GREG did. 
3A-JUST  Andrew just believes that SUZANNE ordered soup at lunch; he doesn’t believe that 
GREG did. 
3B-NEG Andrew doesn’t believe that SUZANNE ordered any soup at lunch; he believes that 
GREG did. 
3B-ONLY  Andrew only believes that SUZANNE ordered any soup at lunch; he doesn’t believe 
that GREG did. 
3B-JUST  Andrew just believes that SUZANNE ordered any soup at lunch; he doesn’t believe 
that GREG did. 
 
4: ever_Champagne 
4A-NEG  The renters aren’t concerned that the CHAMPAGNE spilled on the carpet; they’re 
concerned that the BEER spilled. 
4A-ONLY  The renters are only concerned that the CHAMPAGNE spilled on the carpet; they 
aren’t concerned that the BEER spilled. 
4A-JUST  The renters are just concerned that the CHAMPAGNE spilled on the carpet; they 
aren’t concerned that the BEER spilled. 
4B-NEG  The renters aren’t concerned that the CHAMPAGNE ever spilled on the carpet; 
they’re concerned that the BEER spilled. 
4B-ONLY  The renters are only concerned that the CHAMPAGNE ever spilled on the carpet; 
they aren’t concerned that the BEER spilled. 
4B-JUST  The renters are just concerned that the CHAMPAGNE ever spilled on the carpet; they 
aren’t concerned that the BEER spilled. 
 
5: any_Photographs 
5A-NEG  Ethan doesn’t want DENISE to meet his relatives; he wants RICHARD to meet them. 
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5A-ONLY  Ethan only wants DENISE to meet his relatives; he doesn’t want RICHARD to meet 
them. 
5A-JUST  Ethan just wants DENISE to meet his relatives; he doesn’t want RICHARD to meet 
them. 
5B-NEG  Ethan doesn’t want DENISE to meet any of his relatives; he wants RICHARD to meet 
them. 
5B-ONLY  Ethan only wants DENISE to meet any of his relatives; he doesn’t want RICHARD to 
meet them. 




6A-NEG  Our boss doesn’t hope that ELAINE volunteers to transfer; he hopes that CARRIE 
volunteers. 
6A-ONLY  Our boss only hopes that ELAINE volunteers to transfer; he doesn’t hope that 
CARRIE volunteers. 
6A-JUST  Our boss just hopes that ELAINE volunteers to transfer; he doesn’t hope that 
CARRIE volunteers. 
6B-NEG  Our boss doesn’t hope that ELAINE ever volunteers to transfer; he hopes that 
CARRIE volunteers.  
6B-ONLY  Our boss only hopes that ELAINE ever volunteers to transfer; he doesn’t hope that 
CARRIE volunteers. 




7A-NEG  The doctor doesn’t recommend that JAMAL start weight-training; he recommends 
that LAURA start. 
7A-ONLY  The doctor only recommends that JAMAL start weight-training; he doesn’t 
recommend that LAURA start. 
7A-JUST  The doctor just recommends that JAMAL start weight-training; he doesn’t 
recommend that LAURA start. 
7B-NEG  The doctor doesn’t recommend that JAMAL start any weight-training; he 
recommends that LAURA start. 
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7B-ONLY  The doctor only recommends that JAMAL start any weight-training; he doesn’t 
recommend that LAURA start. 
7B-JUST  The doctor just recommends that JAMAL start any weight-training; he doesn’t 




8A-NEG  The rich couple don’t claim that the CHAUFFEUR dented their sports car; they claim 
that the VALET did. 
8A-ONLY  The rich couple only claim that the CHAUFFEUR dented their sports car; they don’t 
claim that the VALET did. 
8A-JUST   The rich couple just claim that the CHAUFFEUR dented their sports car; they don’t 
claim that the VALET did. 
8B-NEG  The rich couple don’t claim that the CHAUFFEUR ever dented their sports car; they 
claim that the VALET did. 
8B-ONLY  The rich couple only claim that the CHAUFFEUR ever dented their sports car; they 
don’t claim that the VALET did. 
8B-JUST   The rich couple just claim that the CHAUFFEUR ever dented their sports car; they 
don’t claim that the VALET did. 
 
9: any_Movies 
9A-NEG  The film critic doesn’t say that JOANNE borrowed his movies; he says that WILBUR 
borrowed them. 
9A-ONLY  The film critic only says that JOANNE borrowed his movies; he doesn’t say that 
WILBUR borrowed them. 
9A-JUST  The film critic just says that JOANNE borrowed his movies; he doesn’t say that 
WILBUR borrowed them. 
9B-NEG  The film critic doesn’t say that JOANNE borrowed any of his movies; he says that 
WILBUR borrowed them. 
9B-ONLY  The film critic only says that JOANNE borrowed any of his movies; he doesn’t say 
that WILBUR borrowed them. 
9B-JUST  The film critic just says that JOANNE borrowed any of his movies; he doesn’t say 





10A-NEG  My brother doesn’t recall that EILEEN slept through our cousin’s recitals; he recalls 
that DEREK slept through them. 
10A-ONLY  My brother only recalls that EILEEN slept through our cousin’s recitals; he doesn’t 
recall that DEREK slept through them. 
10A-JUST  My brother just recalls that EILEEN slept through our cousin’s recitals; he doesn’t 
recall that DEREK slept through them. 
10B-NEG  My brother doesn’t recall that EILEEN ever slept through our cousin’s recitals; he 
recalls that DEREK slept through them. 
10B-ONLY  My brother only recalls that EILEEN ever slept through our cousin’s recitals; he 
doesn’t recall that DEREK slept through them. 
10B-JUST  My brother just recalls that EILEEN ever slept through our cousin’s recitals; he 
doesn’t recall that DEREK slept through them. 
 
11: any_Coffee 
11A-NEG  My husband isn’t convinced that YVONNE takes milk in her coffee; he’s convinced 
that RUTH does. 
11A-ONLY  My husband is only convinced that YVONNE takes milk in her coffee; he’s not 
convinced that RUTH does. 
11A-JUST  My husband is just convinced that YVONNE takes milk in her coffee; he’s not 
convinced that RUTH does. 
11B-NEG  My husband isn’t convinced that YVONNE takes any milk in her coffee; he’s 
convinced that RUTH does. 
11B-ONLY  My husband is only convinced that YVONNE takes any milk in her coffee; he’s not 
convinced that RUTH does. 
11B-JUST  My husband is just convinced that YVONNE takes any milk in her coffee; he’s not 




12A-NEG The chef doesn’t admit that the DESSERTS were served late; she admits that the 
APPETIZERS were. 




12A-JUST The chef just admits that the DESSERTS were served late; she doesn’t admit that the 
APPETIZERS were. 
12B-NEG The chef doesn’t admit that the DESSERTS were ever served late; she admits that the 
APPETIZERS were. 
12B-ONLY The chef only admits that the DESSERTS were ever served late; she doesn’t admit 
that the APPETIZERS were. 
12B-JUST The chef just admits that the DESSERTS were ever served late; she doesn’t admit 







































Appendix G: Consent form for final experiment 
 
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 




CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
 
Title of Research Study: Judging variations of English sentences in Mechanical Turk  
 
Principal Investigator: Tally Callahan (M.A., M.Phil., CUNY Graduate Center) 
    Ph.D. Student (Linguistics)  
 
Faculty Advisor:  Janet Dean Fodor (Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 
      Distinguished Professor 
 
 
My name is Tally Callahan and I am a graduate student in the Ph.D. Program in Linguistics at the 
Graduate Center of the City University of New York. I am interested in how native English speakers 
judge the acceptability of similar sentences. You are being asked to participate in a research study 
because you’re a native speaker of English and grew up speaking English in the United States. You 
are one of approximately 90 people to participate in this study. Though there will be different 






The purpose of this research study is to examine how different native speakers of American English 
judge variations of English sentences. It will increase our understanding of how they process 
different types of sentences. 
 
Procedures:   
If you volunteer to participate in this research study, we will ask you to do the following: 
 You will be presented with some sentences to read or listen to 
 You will be asked to respond to them in ways such as: 
o Repeating them back 
o Making judgments on whether they are similar or different 
o Judging their acceptability on some sort of scale 
o Etc. 
 
This is not intended as an evaluation of your intelligence and/or knowledge. I am interested in your 




Your participation in this research study is expected to last for approximately 15-20 minutes, 
though you are welcome to take longer if you find you need extra time. 
 
Potential Risks or Discomforts:  
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 Participation in any study carries with it some risk of subject privacy and data 
confidentiality. I have taken substantial measures to minimize any risks and potential 
security breaches.  Your Mechanical Turk number and name will NOT be mentioned in any 
report of the results. No identifying characteristics will be reported in the results. In the 
data analysis, your responses will be combined with those from other participants.  
 My research advisor and I may publish the results of this study, but will not publish any 
identifying characteristics. I will not ask for your name. The data from this study will be 
filed under an anonymous code number and will be stored in a password protected folder. 
 If you find participating in the study to be uncomfortable, for any reason at all, you may stop 
at any time. 
 
 
Potential Benefits:  
 There is no specific personal benefit to you from participating, but the results of the study 
will increase scientific understanding of how humans process and understand language. We 
will be very grateful for your contribution to this research goal. 
 If you would like to know the outcomes of this research, please send a brief request to the 
project’s email address: (tcallahankanik@gradcenter.cuny.edu). We will send you a copy of 
the report when it is available. 
 
 
Payment for Participation:  
 
 For your time, you will receive $2.34 in compensation through the Mechanical Turk 
payment method. You must complete the survey fully to be able to qualify for compensation.  
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 You will only ever be eligible for compensation for ONE version of this survey (there will be 
multiple versions of this survey).  
 Please note that I will be screening responses to ensure that your answers fall within an 
acceptable error rate that suggests you did not answer the questions randomly. If your 
answers do not pass this screening, I will not be able to compensate you. In the event of this, 
none of your data or information will be recorded.  
 Barring any emergencies or unforeseen complications, you should be compensated within a 




We will make our best efforts to maintain confidentiality of any information that is collected during 
this research study, and that can identify you. We will disclose this information only with your 
permission or as required by law. 
 
Your Mechanical Turk number and name will NOT be mentioned in any report of the results. No 
identifying characteristics will be reported in the results. We will protect your confidentiality by 
creating unique identifiers for your individual data, which can in no way identify you personally. 
Any links between these unique identifiers and your Mechanical Turk worker ID or name, or any 
other identifying information that we may possibly ever receive (e.g. your email address if you 
email us) will only be retained for monetary compensation purposes and will only ever be available 
to the primary investigator and her advisor. These links will be stored separately from the study 
data and both will be stored in a password protected folder. In the data analysis, your responses 




The research team, authorized CUNY staff, and government agencies that oversee this type of 
research may have access to research data and records in order to monitor the research. Research 
records provided to authorized, non-CUNY individuals will not contain identifiable information 
about you. Publications and/or presentations that result from this study will not identify you by 
name.  
 
The data you provide may be shared with other researchers doing work in related areas. No 
identifying characteristics will be provided to these researchers and your Mechanical Turk number 
and name will only ever be known by the primary investigator and her advisor.  
 
 
Participants’ Rights:  
 
 Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to 
participate, there will be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any benefits to which you 
are otherwise entitled. 
 
 You can decide to withdraw your consent and stop participating in the research at any time, 
without any penalty. 
 
Questions, Comments or Concerns:  
If you have any questions, comments or concerns about the research, please feel free to email them 




If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments or 
concerns that you would like to discuss with someone other than the researchers, please call the 
CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918. Alternately, you can write to: 
 
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research 
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator 
205 East 42nd Street 
New York, NY 10017 
 
Digital Acceptance of Participant: 
If you agree to participate in this research study, please click the “I accept” option below this form. 
Please keep a copy of this consent form for your records. 
 
I have read the above purpose of the study, and understand my role in participating in the research. 
I volunteer to take part in this research. I have had a chance to ask questions. If I have questions 
later, about the research, I can ask the investigator listed above. I understand that I may refuse to 
participate or withdraw from participation at any time without jeopardizing my employment, 
student status or other rights to which I am entitled. The investigator may withdraw me at his/her 
professional discretion. If I have questions about my rights as a research participant, I can call the 
CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918. I certify that I am 18 years of age or 
older and freely give my consent to participate in this study. I will receive a copy of this document 






Appendix H: Final experiment explanation and tutorial  
 
TUTORIAL 
For this task, you will be presented with sentences and then asked to judge their acceptability as 
well-formed sentences of English.  
 
There are two types of sentences in this task:  
A) Sentences where no specific situation is provided: these should be judged on their grammatical 
acceptability in spoken English. (There will be examples below.) 
B) Sentences where a specific situation is provided (marked by a “Situation” tag): these are to be 
judged as spoken in the specifically defined situations provided. These situations consist of a few 
sentences to provide a contextual setting. You will then be asked to judge how acceptable you find 
the sentence, given the situation. For these sentences, in some cases you may find them 
grammatically unacceptable, while in other cases you may find them unacceptable because they’re 
simply untrue, given the situation. (Again, there will be examples below.) 
 
For both sentence types, you will rate them on a scale from 1 to 6, with 1 being “Completely 
Unacceptable” and 6 being “Completely Acceptable.” 
 
Capital letters indicate verbal emphasis: 
All of the sentences will consist of two parts separated by a semicolon and will have some words 
written with CAPITAL LETTERS. Please think of these words in capitals as receiving emphasis in the 
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sentence. By emphasis, we mean that if you were to say the sentence aloud, you would pronounce 
those words louder or with more stress in order to emphasize them. For example: 
  
John SAW his sister; he didn’t SPEAK to her. 
  
In this sentence, the speaker is emphasizing that John saw his sister but didn’t speak to her by 
emphasizing the verbs “saw” and “speak.” 
 
Sentences with different versions: 
Throughout this task, you will see different versions of sentences that you may have seen 
previously. They have been placed in a random order. Note that these are not duplicate sentences; 
the versions have small differences. Often, only one or two words will differ between the versions; 
however, your judgments for them may not be the same. Therefore, it is important that you evaluate 
each presentation separately, ignoring your judgment on any other versions. 
Examples: 
The following examples are provided to help you understand the task. For each of them, indicate on 
the scale how you would rate their acceptability.  




Click on a number for your acceptability judgment (1 being "Completely Unacceptable," 6 being 
"Completely Acceptable") 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Answer 1A: Since there is no “Situation” tag preceding the sentence, we are judging it on its 
grammatical acceptability. To a native speaker of English (learned as their first language), this 
sentence is completely acceptable, therefore, a typical expected answer to Example 1 would be high 
on the scale (e.g. a “6”). 
 
Now imagine that somebody said the following sentence: 
Example 2: I ate a SNACK; I didn’t very eat a MEAL. 
 
Click on a number for your acceptability judgment (1 being "Completely Unacceptable," 6 being 
"Completely Acceptable") 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Answer 2: A native speaker of English would probably score Example 2 low on the scale (e.g. a “1”). 
While only one word (“very”) has been added to this sentence, a typical speaker of English would 




Here is a different example.  
Example 3: Wallace didn’t make some PROGRESS; he actually suffered a REGRESSION. 
 
Click on a number for your acceptability judgment (1 being "Completely Unacceptable," 6 being 
"Completely Acceptable") 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Answer 3: This is an example of a sentence which for many English speakers may not lie clearly on 
one end of the scale or the other. The way this sentence is worded makes this example trickier, due 
to how different speakers of English may feel about the emphasis of the phrase “some PROGRESS.” 
You may or may not regard this sentence as completely unacceptable or completely acceptable. If 
you find this sentence to sound strange, but not completely unacceptable, you might rate it a “2.” On 
the other hand, if this sentence sounds pretty good to you, but not perfect, you might rate it a “4” or 
“5.” 
 
Here’s another example of a sentence that people may disagree about. What do you think? Keep in 
mind that you are trying to judge how grammatically acceptable this sentence is in spoken English. 
If you heard a speaker say the following sentence, how acceptable would you find it? Your judgment 





Example 4: Mother sent my brother and I out to play. 
Click on a number for your acceptability judgment (1 being "Completely Unacceptable," 6 being 
"Completely Acceptable") 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
Some of the questions you will see on this survey begin with a "Situation" tag. An example of a 
Situation question is provided below. 
 
Example 5: 
Situation: Warren often takes vacations to go fishing. On his last trip, he visited a lake with his 
friends. Every morning, they took a canoe out onto the lake. Over the course of the vacation, Warren 
caught seven salmon and his friend Joseph caught five. 
 
Is the following a sentence that is both acceptable and true, given this situation? 
WARREN didn't catch any fish on the trip; JOSEPH caught five. 
 
Click on a number for your acceptability judgment (1 being "Completely Unacceptable," 6 being 
"Completely Acceptable") 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
119 
 
Answer 5: While this is a grammatically acceptable sentence, it’s not true in the described situation. 
The situation specifically stated that Warren caught seven salmon, which means he caught fish. 
Therefore, this sentence should get a low score (e.g. "1"). 
























Appendix I: List composition (all lists) 
 4 PAIRS of NEG NPI sentences 
4 PAIRS of JUST NPI sentences 
4 PAIRS of ONLY NPI sentences 
2 Modal Scope (MAY + EXCLUSIVE) sentences 
21 FILLER PAIRS 
10 Modal/Short Story FILLER SENTENCES 
Total: 78 Sentences 
 List A NEG Sentences: 1, 4, 7, 10 
List B NEG Sentences: 3, 6, 9, 12 
List C NEG Sentences: 2, 5, 8, 11 
List A ONLY Sentences: 2, 5, 8, 11 
List B ONLY Sentences: 1, 4, 7, 10 
List C ONLY Sentences: 3, 6, 9, 12 
List A JUST Sentences: 3, 6, 9, 12 
List B JUST Sentences: 2, 5, 8, 11 
List C JUST Sentences: 1, 4, 7, 10 
 List A Modal/Scope: 13-ONLY, 14-JUST 
List B Modal/Scope: 13-JUST, 15-ONLY 

























Appendix H: Final experiment lists  
Color Legend: 
Grey Padding Fillers (Warm-ups and Ends) 
Green A Fillers 
Blue B Fillers 
Yellow Context Filler 
Dark Orange Experimental Item 
Red Outline 
Ungrammatical Filler OR Unacceptable, given 





David tells me that GEOLOGY is difficult to teach kids at summer camp; Leigh 
tells me that PAINTING is, instead. 
WU2 F14B 
Darcy is surprised that her FATHER loved to build model airplanes tomorrow; 
she isn’t surprised that her MOTHER did. 
WU3 F33 
Lewis can pick up the clothes from the dry cleaners TODAY; he can’t do it 
TOMORROW. 
Alpha Block: 9 B Fillers, 10 A Fillers, 4 Context Fillers, 1 Modal/Scope 
1a F1B 
Josephine admires that OWEN took his dog on vacation with him last summer; 









James may just drive the VAN without his parents; he may not drive the SPORTS 
CAR. 
2a F16B 
Linda complains that her MOTHER-IN-LAW kind of listens to country music; 




John only knows that JEROME visited our friends in Sweden; he doesn’t know 
that MARY visited them. 
2c F12A 
Carver concludes that his ASSISTANT plays tennis at the country club; he doesn’t 
conclude that his SECRETARY does. 
3a F26 
The teacher must grade the final exams by TOMORROW; she doesn’t have to 




Andrew just believes that SUZANNE ordered soup at lunch; he doesn’t believe 
that GREG did. 
3c F2B 
The tech representative tells me that JULIA worked night shifts this last week; he 
didn’t tell me that HARVEY did, too. 
4a F17B 
Bill confides that GEORGIA’S parents a little hated her kindergarten teacher; Kyle 




The renters aren’t concerned that the CHAMPAGNE spilled on the carpet; they’re 
concerned that the BEER spilled. 
4c F11B 
The child is upset that ALPHONSE rudely sipped her apple juice; she isn’t upset 
that WALLACE did. 
5a F28 
The cake should have been ordered YESTERDAY; the ice cream didn’t need to be 






Ethan only wants DENISE to meet his relatives; he doesn’t want RICHARD to 
meet them. 
5c F3A 
The teacher notices that ALFRED brought his tablet on the school trip; she 
doesn’t notice that JARED did, too. 
6a F13A 
Jen reads that BEARS catch fish at the river outside of town; she doesn’t read that 




Our boss just hopes that ELAINE volunteers to transfer; he doesn’t hope that 
CARRIE volunteers. 
6c F10B 
Louisa forgets that TIMOTHY will sing in the play yesterday; she doesn’t forget 
that LAWRENCE will sing in it, too. 
7a F4A 
Milly is sad that the ELECTRIC BILL was lost in the mail on Tuesday; she isn’t sad 




The doctor doesn’t recommend that JAMAL start any weight-training; he 
recommends that LAURA start. 
7c F19B 
My best friend writes that her COWORKER kind of annoys her at her job; my 
brother writes that his SUPERVISOR does. 
8a F18A 
Timothy assumes that JOSEPH wanted to buy popsicles for dessert; Anthony 




The rich couple only claim that the CHAUFFEUR ever dented their sports car; 
they don’t claim that the VALET did. 
8c F9A 
My father demonstrates that ROBINS visit his birdhouse; he doesn’t demonstrate 
that HUMMINGBIRDS also visit it. 
9a F32 





The film critic just says that JOANNE borrowed any of his movies; he doesn’t say 
that WILBUR borrowed them. 
9c F5A 
Natalie senses that her BROTHER will make milkshakes for the picnic; she 
doesn’t sense that her SISTER will. 
10a F14A 
Darcy is surprised that her FATHER loved to build model airplanes; she isn’t 




My brother doesn’t recall that EILEEN ever slept through our cousin’s recitals; he 
recalls that DEREK slept through them. 
10c F8A 
The vice principal remarks that KENNETH gets high marks on his exams; she 
doesn’t remark that JESSE does, too. 
11a F6A 
Tim likes that the POPCORN will be served fresh at the movie showing; he 




My husband is only convinced that YVONNE takes any milk in her coffee; he’s not 
convinced that RUTH does. 
11c F15B 
My piano teacher informs me that SPINACH is really the healthiest food; my 
physical therapist informs me that CARROTS are. 




The chef just admits that the DESSERTS were ever served late; she doesn’t admit 
that the APPETIZERS were. 
12c F7B 
Penelope is certain that my AUNT has a recital in last March; she’s not certain 
that my COUSIN has one.  
Beta Block: 9 A Fillers, 10 B Fillers, 4 Context Fillers, 1 Modal/Scope 
13a F21A 
Gilbert brags that his GRANDMOTHER excels at cribbage; Felicity brags that her 
HUSBAND does. 
13b 1B- Wendy doesn’t think that BERNARD ruins any of her parties; she thinks that 
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NEG KATHY ruins them. 
13c F31 
At the library, William can quietly listen to his music with HEADPHONES; he can’t 
use his SPEAKERS. 
14a F15A 
My piano teacher informs me that SPINACH is the healthiest food; my physical 




John only knows that JEROME ever visited our friends in Sweden; he doesn’t 
know that MARY visited them. 
14c F6B 
Tim likes that the POPCORN will be served fresh at the next movie showing; he 
doesn’t like that the NACHOS will be served fresh, too. 
15a F8B 
The vice principal remarks that KENNETH gets quickly high marks on his exams; 




Andrew just believes that SUZANNE ordered any soup at lunch; he doesn’t 
believe that GREG did. 
15c F20B 
David tells me that GEOLOGY is a little difficult to teach kids at summer camp; 
Leigh tells me that PAINTING is, instead. 
16a F5B 
Natalie senses that her BROTHER will make milkshakes for the next picnic; she 




The renters aren’t concerned that the CHAMPAGNE ever spilled on the carpet; 
they’re concerned that the BEER spilled. 
16c F29 Larry should roughly HIT the vending machine; he shouldn't carefully TAP it. 
17a F9B 
My father demonstrates that ROBINS regularly visit his birdhouse; he doesn’t 




Ethan only wants DENISE to meet any of his relatives; he doesn’t want RICHARD 
to meet them. 
17c F18B 
Timothy assumes that JOSEPH really wanted to buy popsicles for dessert; 
Anthony assumes that SERENA wanted to buy them herself. 
18a F19A 
My best friend writes that her COWORKER annoys her at her job; my brother 




Our boss just hopes that ELAINE ever volunteers to transfer; he doesn’t hope that 
CARRIE volunteers. 
18c F4B 
Milly is sad that the ELECTRIC BILL was lost in the mail on last Tuesday; she isn’t 
sad that the WATER BILL was lost. 
19a F10A 
Louisa forgets that TIMOTHY will sing in the play; she doesn’t forget that 




The doctor doesn’t recommend that JAMAL start weight-training; he 
recommends that LAURA start. 
19c F13B 
Jen reads that BEARS patiently catch fish at the river outside of town; she doesn’t 
read that OTTERS do, too. 
20a F3B 
The teacher notices that ALFRED brought his tablet on the last school trip; she 




The rich couple only claim that the CHAUFFEUR dented their sports car; they 
don’t claim that the VALET did. 
20c F27 
The family dog must quickly obey Clark to get treats; she doesn’t have to obey 
Clark’s kids to get treats. 
21a F11A 





The film critic just says that JOANNE borrowed his movies; he doesn’t say that 
WILBUR borrowed them. 
21c F17A Bill confides that GEORGIA’S parents hated her kindergarten teacher; Kyle 
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confides that TABITHA’S parents did. 
22a F2A 
The tech representative tells me that JULIA worked night shifts this week; he 




My brother doesn’t recall that EILEEN slept through our cousin’s recitals; he 
recalls that DEREK slept through them. 
22c F25 Terrance must clean INSIDE today; he doesn't have to work OUTSIDE. 
23a F12B 
Carver concludes that his ASSISTANT frequently plays tennis at the country club; 




My husband is only convinced that YVONNE takes milk in her coffee; he’s not 
convinced that RUTH does. 
23c F16A 
Linda complains that her MOTHER-IN-LAW listens to country music; Jimmy 









The chef just admits that the DESSERTS were served late; she doesn’t admit that 
the APPETIZERS were. 
24c F1A 
Josephine admires that OWEN took his dog on vacation with him summer; she 
doesn’t admire that DEREK also took his. 
E1 F21B 
Gilbert brags that his GRANDMOTHER excels really at cribbage; Felicity brags 
that her HUSBAND does. 
E2 F30 
The Girl Scout should ask the office workers ONE time if they want to buy 
cookies; she doesn’t need to ask them MANY times. 
E3 F7A 
Penelope is certain that my AUNT has a recital in March; she’s not certain that my 




David tells me that GEOLOGY is difficult to teach kids at summer camp; Leigh 
tells me that PAINTING is, instead. 
WU2 F14B 
Darcy is surprised that her FATHER loved to build model airplanes tomorrow; 
she isn’t surprised that her MOTHER did. 
WU3 F33 
Lewis can pick up the clothes from the dry cleaners TODAY; he can’t do it 
TOMORROW. 
Alpha Block: 9 B Fillers, 10 A Fillers, 4 Context Fillers, 1 Modal/Scope 
1a F1B 
Josephine admires that OWEN took his dog on vacation with him last summer; 




Wendy only thinks that BERNARD ruins her parties; she doesn’t think that 




Nick may just eat PIZZA for dinner tonight; he may not have BREADSTICKS as 
well. 
2a F16B 
Linda complains that her MOTHER-IN-LAW kind of listens to country music; 




John just knows that JEROME visited our friends in Sweden; he doesn’t know that 
MARY visited them. 
2c F12A 
Carver concludes that his ASSISTANT plays tennis at the country club; he doesn’t 
conclude that his SECRETARY does. 
3a F26 
The teacher must grade the final exams by TOMORROW; she doesn’t have to 






Andrew doesn’t believe that SUZANNE ordered soup at lunch; he believes that 
GREG did. 
3c F2B 
The tech representative tells me that JULIA worked night shifts this last week; he 
didn’t tell me that HARVEY did, too. 
4a F17B 
Bill confides that GEORGIA’S parents a little hated her kindergarten teacher; Kyle 




The renters are only concerned that the CHAMPAGNE spilled on the carpet; they 
aren’t concerned that the BEER spilled. 
4c F11B 
The child is upset that ALPHONSE rudely sipped her apple juice; she isn’t upset 
that WALLACE did. 
5a F28 
The cake should have been ordered YESTERDAY; the ice cream didn’t need to be 




Ethan just wants DENISE to meet his relatives; he doesn’t want RICHARD to meet 
them. 
5c F3A 
The teacher notices that ALFRED brought his tablet on the school trip; she 
doesn’t notice that JARED did, too. 
6a F13A 
Jen reads that BEARS catch fish at the river outside of town; she doesn’t read that 




Our boss doesn’t hope that ELAINE volunteers to transfer; he hopes that CARRIE 
volunteers. 
6c F10B 
Louisa forgets that TIMOTHY will sing in the play yesterday; she doesn’t forget 
that LAWRENCE will sing in it, too. 
7a F4A 
Milly is sad that the ELECTRIC BILL was lost in the mail on Tuesday; she isn’t sad 




The doctor only recommends that JAMAL start any weight-training; he doesn’t 
recommend that LAURA start. 
7c F19B 
My best friend writes that her COWORKER kind of annoys her at her job; my 
brother writes that his SUPERVISOR does. 
8a F18A 
Timothy assumes that JOSEPH wanted to buy popsicles for dessert; Anthony 




The rich couple just claim that the CHAUFFEUR ever dented their sports car; they 
don’t claim that the VALET did. 
8c F9A 
My father demonstrates that ROBINS visit his birdhouse; he doesn’t demonstrate 
that HUMMINGBIRDS also visit it. 
9a F32 





The film critic doesn’t say that JOANNE borrowed any of his movies; he says that 
WILBUR borrowed them. 
9c F5A 
Natalie senses that her BROTHER will make milkshakes for the picnic; she 
doesn’t sense that her SISTER will. 
10a F14A 
Darcy is surprised that her FATHER loved to build model airplanes; she isn’t 




My brother only recalls that EILEEN ever slept through our cousin’s recitals; he 
doesn’t recall that DEREK slept through them. 
10c F8A 
The vice principal remarks that KENNETH gets high marks on his exams; she 
doesn’t remark that JESSE does, too. 
11a F6A 
Tim likes that the POPCORN will be served fresh at the movie showing; he 




My husband is just convinced that YVONNE takes any milk in her coffee; he’s not 




My piano teacher informs me that SPINACH is really the healthiest food; my 
physical therapist informs me that CARROTS are. 




The chef doesn’t admit that the DESSERTS were ever served late; she admits that 
the APPETIZERS were. 
12c F7B 
Penelope is certain that my AUNT has a recital in last March; she’s not certain 
that my COUSIN has one.  
Beta Block: 9 A Fillers, 10 B Fillers, 4 Context Fillers, 1 Modal/Scope 
13a F21A 





Wendy only thinks that BERNARD ruins any of her parties; she doesn’t think that 
KATHY ruins them. 
13c F31 
At the library, William can quietly listen to his music with HEADPHONES; he can’t 
use his SPEAKERS. 
14a F15A 
My piano teacher informs me that SPINACH is the healthiest food; my physical 




John just knows that JEROME ever visited our friends in Sweden; he doesn’t 
know that MARY visited them. 
14c F6B 
Tim likes that the POPCORN will be served fresh at the next movie showing; he 
doesn’t like that the NACHOS will be served fresh, too. 
15a F8B 
The vice principal remarks that KENNETH quickly gets high marks on his exams; 




Andrew doesn’t believe that SUZANNE ordered any soup at lunch; he believes 
that GREG did. 
15c F20B 
David tells me that GEOLOGY is a little difficult to teach kids at summer camp; 
Leigh tells me that PAINTING is, instead. 
16a F5B 
Natalie senses that her BROTHER will make milkshakes for the next picnic; she 




The renters are only concerned that the CHAMPAGNE ever spilled on the carpet; 
they aren’t concerned that the BEER spilled. 
16c F29 Larry should roughly HIT the vending machine; he shouldn't carefully TAP it. 
17a F9B 
My father demonstrates that ROBINS regularly visit his birdhouse; he doesn’t 




Ethan just wants DENISE to meet any of his relatives; he doesn’t want RICHARD 
to meet them. 
17c F18B 
Timothy assumes that JOSEPH really wanted to buy popsicles for dessert; 
Anthony assumes that SERENA wanted to buy them herself. 
18a F19A 
My best friend writes that her COWORKER annoys her at her job; my brother 




Our boss doesn’t hope that ELAINE ever volunteers to transfer; he hopes that 
CARRIE volunteers.  
18c F4B 
Milly is sad that the ELECTRIC BILL was lost in the mail on last Tuesday; she isn’t 
sad that the WATER BILL was lost. 
19a F10A 
Louisa forgets that TIMOTHY will sing in the play; she doesn’t forget that 




The doctor only recommends that JAMAL start weight-training; he doesn’t 
recommend that LAURA start. 
19c F13B 
Jen reads that BEARS patiently catch fish at the river outside of town; she doesn’t 




The teacher notices that ALFRED brought his tablet on the last school trip; she 




The rich couple just claim that the CHAUFFEUR dented their sports car; they 
don’t claim that the VALET did. 
20c F27 
The family dog must quickly obey Clark to get treats; she doesn’t have to obey 
Clark’s kids to get treats. 
21a F11A 





The film critic doesn’t say that JOANNE borrowed his movies; he says that 
WILBUR borrowed them. 
21c F17A 
Bill confides that GEORGIA’S parents hated her kindergarten teacher; Kyle 
confides that TABITHA’S parents did. 
22a F2A 
The tech representative tells me that JULIA worked night shifts this week; he 




My brother only recalls that EILEEN slept through our cousin’s recitals; he 
doesn’t recall that DEREK slept through them. 
22c F25 Terrance must clean INSIDE today; he doesn't have to work OUTSIDE. 
23a F12B 
Carver concludes that his ASSISTANT frequently plays tennis at the country club; 




My husband is just convinced that YVONNE takes milk in her coffee; he’s not 
convinced that RUTH does. 
23c F16A 
Linda complains that her MOTHER-IN-LAW listens to country music; Jimmy 









The chef doesn’t admit that the DESSERTS were served late; she admits that the 
APPETIZERS were. 
24c F1A 
Josephine admires that OWEN took his dog on vacation with him summer; she 
doesn’t admire that DEREK also took his. 
E1 F21B 
Gilbert brags that his GRANDMOTHER excels really at cribbage; Felicity brags 
that her HUSBAND does. 
E2 F30 
The Girl Scout should ask the office workers ONE time if they want to buy 
cookies; she doesn’t need to ask them MANY times. 
E3 F7A 
Penelope is certain that my AUNT has a recital in March; she’s not certain that my 




David tells me that GEOLOGY is difficult to teach kids at summer camp; Leigh 
tells me that PAINTING is, instead. 
WU2 F14B 
Darcy is surprised that her FATHER loved to build model airplanes tomorrow; 
she isn’t surprised that her MOTHER did. 
WU3 F33 
Lewis can pick up the clothes from the dry cleaners TODAY; he can’t do it 
TOMORROW. 
Alpha Block: 9 B Fillers, 10 A Fillers, 4 Context Fillers, 1 Modal/Scope 
1a F1B 
Josephine admires that OWEN took his dog on vacation with him last summer; 
she doesn’t admire that DEREK also took his. 
1b 1A- Wendy just thinks that BERNARD ruins her parties; she doesn’t think that KATHY 
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James may only drive the VAN without his parents; he may not drive the SPORTS 
CAR. 
2a F16B 
Linda complains that her MOTHER-IN-LAW kind of listens to country music; 




John doesn’t know that JEROME visited our friends in Sweden; he knows that 
MARY visited them. 
2c F12A 
Carver concludes that his ASSISTANT plays tennis at the country club; he doesn’t 
conclude that his SECRETARY does. 
3a F26 
The teacher must grade the final exams by TOMORROW; she doesn’t have to 




Andrew only believes that SUZANNE ordered soup at lunch; he doesn’t believe 
that GREG did. 
3c F2B 
The tech representative tells me that JULIA worked night shifts this last week; he 
didn’t tell me that HARVEY did, too. 
4a F17B 
Bill confides that GEORGIA’S parents a little hated her kindergarten teacher; Kyle 




The renters are just concerned that the CHAMPAGNE spilled on the carpet; they 
aren’t concerned that the BEER spilled. 
4c F11B 
The child is upset that ALPHONSE rudely sipped her apple juice; she isn’t upset 
that WALLACE did. 
5a F28 
The cake should have been ordered YESTERDAY; the ice cream didn’t need to be 




Ethan doesn’t want DENISE to meet his relatives; he wants RICHARD to meet 
them. 
5c F3A 
The teacher notices that ALFRED brought his tablet on the school trip; she 
doesn’t notice that JARED did, too. 
6a F13A 
Jen reads that BEARS catch fish at the river outside of town; she doesn’t read that 




Our boss only hopes that ELAINE volunteers to transfer; he doesn’t hope that 
CARRIE volunteers. 
6c F10B 
Louisa forgets that TIMOTHY will sing in the play yesterday; she doesn’t forget 
that LAWRENCE will sing in it, too. 
7a F4A 
Milly is sad that the ELECTRIC BILL was lost in the mail on Tuesday; she isn’t sad 




The doctor just recommends that JAMAL start any weight-training; he doesn’t 
recommend that LAURA start. 
7c F19B 
My best friend writes that her COWORKER kind of annoys her at her job; my 
brother writes that his SUPERVISOR does. 
8a F18A 
Timothy assumes that JOSEPH wanted to buy popsicles for dessert; Anthony 




The rich couple don’t claim that the CHAUFFEUR ever dented their sports car; 
they claim that the VALET did. 
8c F9A 
My father demonstrates that ROBINS visit his birdhouse; he doesn’t demonstrate 
that HUMMINGBIRDS also visit it. 
9a F32 





The film critic only says that JOANNE borrowed any of his movies; he doesn’t say 




Natalie senses that her BROTHER will make milkshakes for the picnic; she 
doesn’t sense that her SISTER will. 
10a F14A 
Darcy is surprised that her FATHER loved to build model airplanes; she isn’t 




My brother just recalls that EILEEN ever slept through our cousin’s recitals; he 
doesn’t recall that DEREK slept through them. 
10c F8A 
The vice principal remarks that KENNETH gets high marks on his exams; she 
doesn’t remark that JESSE does, too. 
11a F6A 
Tim likes that the POPCORN will be served fresh at the movie showing; he 




My husband isn’t convinced that YVONNE takes any milk in her coffee; he’s 
convinced that RUTH does. 
11c F15B 
My piano teacher informs me that SPINACH is really the healthiest food; my 
physical therapist informs me that CARROTS are. 




The chef only admits that the DESSERTS were ever served late; she doesn’t admit 
that the APPETIZERS were. 
12c F7B 
Penelope is certain that my AUNT has a recital in last March; she’s not certain 
that my COUSIN has one.  
Beta Block: 9 A Fillers, 10 B Fillers, 4 Context Fillers, 1 Modal/Scope 
13a F21A 





Wendy just thinks that BERNARD ruins any of her parties; she doesn’t think that 
KATHY ruins them. 
13c F31 
At the library, William can quietly listen to his music with HEADPHONES; he can’t 
use his SPEAKERS. 
14a F15A 
My piano teacher informs me that SPINACH is the healthiest food; my physical 




John doesn’t know that JEROME ever visited our friends in Sweden; he knows 
that MARY visited them. 
14c F6B 
Tim likes that the POPCORN will be served fresh at the next movie showing; he 
doesn’t like that the NACHOS will be served fresh, too. 
15a F8B 
The vice principal remarks that KENNETH quickly gets high marks on his exams; 




Andrew only believes that SUZANNE ordered any soup at lunch; he doesn’t 
believe that GREG did. 
15c F20B 
David tells me that GEOLOGY is a little difficult to teach kids at summer camp; 
Leigh tells me that PAINTING is, instead. 
16a F5B 
Natalie senses that her BROTHER will make milkshakes for the next picnic; she 




The renters are just concerned that the CHAMPAGNE ever spilled on the carpet; 
they aren’t concerned that the BEER spilled. 
16c F29 Larry should roughly HIT the vending machine; he shouldn't carefully TAP it. 
17a F9B 
My father demonstrates that ROBINS regularly visit his birdhouse; he doesn’t 




Ethan doesn’t want DENISE to meet any of his relatives; he wants RICHARD to 
meet them. 
17c F18B 
Timothy assumes that JOSEPH really wanted to buy popsicles for dessert; 




My best friend writes that her COWORKER annoys her at her job; my brother 




Our boss only hopes that ELAINE ever volunteers to transfer; he doesn’t hope 
that CARRIE volunteers. 
18c F4B 
Milly is sad that the ELECTRIC BILL was lost in the mail on last Tuesday; she isn’t 
sad that the WATER BILL was lost. 
19a F10A 
Louisa forgets that TIMOTHY will sing in the play; she doesn’t forget that 




The doctor just recommends that JAMAL start weight-training; he doesn’t 
recommend that LAURA start. 
19c F13B 
Jen reads that BEARS patiently catch fish at the river outside of town; she doesn’t 
read that OTTERS do, too. 
20a F3B 
The teacher notices that ALFRED brought his tablet on the last school trip; she 




The rich couple don’t claim that the CHAUFFEUR dented their sports car; they 
claim that the VALET did. 
20c F27 
The family dog must quickly obey Clark to get treats; she doesn’t have to obey 
Clark’s kids to get treats. 
21a F11A 





The film critic only says that JOANNE borrowed his movies; he doesn’t say that 
WILBUR borrowed them. 
21c F17A 
Bill confides that GEORGIA’S parents hated her kindergarten teacher; Kyle 
confides that TABITHA’S parents did. 
22a F2A 
The tech representative tells me that JULIA worked night shifts this week; he 




My brother just recalls that EILEEN slept through our cousin’s recitals; he doesn’t 
recall that DEREK slept through them. 
22c F25 Terrance must clean INSIDE today; he doesn't have to work OUTSIDE. 
23a F12B 
Carver concludes that his ASSISTANT frequently plays tennis at the country club; 




My husband isn’t convinced that YVONNE takes milk in her coffee; he’s convinced 
that RUTH does. 
23c F16A 
Linda complains that her MOTHER-IN-LAW listens to country music; Jimmy 









The chef only admits that the DESSERTS were served late; she doesn’t admit that 
the APPETIZERS were. 
24c F1A 
Josephine admires that OWEN took his dog on vacation with him summer; she 
doesn’t admire that DEREK also took his. 
E1 F21B 
Gilbert brags that his GRANDMOTHER excels really at cribbage; Felicity brags 
that her HUSBAND does. 
E2 F30 
The Girl Scout should ask the office workers ONE time if they want to buy 
cookies; she doesn’t need to ask them MANY times. 
E3 F7A 
Penelope is certain that my AUNT has a recital in March; she’s not certain that my 
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